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“In the beginning was the Word.” This quote from the Holy Bible also stands on the ceiling 
of our discipline’s temple. The job of legal scholarship is interpreting, and the base of every 
interpretation is the word.
1 
 
In this paper we are going to analyze how constitutional courts are able to extract the most 
meaning from a, necessarily, short text,
2
 such as a constitution, with the use of 
sophisticated tricks, or methods, of interpretation. Partly with the help of these methods, 
and partly on the basis of text-independent speculations, constitutional courts and legal 
scholars are able to develop a system of concepts (a Rechtsdogmatik,
3
 or its specific 
constitutional part, the Verfassungsdogmatik) considerably more sophisticated than the 
one of the actual text of the constitution in order to serve as a helping toolkit for the 
solution of future cases.
4
 After analyzing some preliminary issues in part A, the largest part 
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1 GUSZTÁV SZÁSZY-SCHWARZ, PARERGA: VEGYES JOGI DOLGOZATOK 420 (1912) (author’s translation). 
2 The short and abstract nature of constitutions is not to be explained by a cynical attempt to make it more 
difficult to control state power, but for such a view see Napoléon Bonaparte: “[i]l faut qu’une constitution soit 
courte et obscure” (a Constitution has to be short and obscure). The actual reason for this is that the constitution 
maker could not decide everything beforehand, on the one hand, and that too many detailed rules would inflate 
the text of the constitution and make it necessary to modify the text often, which would ruin its prestige, on the 
other hand. See Meinhard Hilf, Die sprachliche Struktur der Verfassung, in VII HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 79, 90 (Josef Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1992). 
3 The German term Rechtsdogmatik is normally translated into English either as “doctrine” or as “dogmatic.” I 
would, however, stick to the German original as “doctrine” is too general and does not express the systematic 
conceptual nature of the genre, and dogmatic has a rather pejorative connotation in English, which I would like to 
avoid. One of the reasons for translation problems is that in common law countries the conceptual system as 
developed by legal scholarship is relatively simplistic—it is done by judgments on a case-by-case basis. 
4 A sophisticated conceptual system also helps (a) to decide future cases the same way, if their relevant facts are 
the same, and (b) to give reasons for this, i.e., not to decide arbitrarily and not to appear to have decided 
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of this study will deal with the different methods of constitutional interpretation in part B. 
Then, the nature of this conceptual system will be analyzed in part C, before turning to the 
question of styles of constitutional reasoning in part D. The analysis concentrates on the 
practice of European constitutional courts, though for purposes of classification and 
comparison, non-European practices will also be mentioned. 
 
A. Constitutional Reasoning in General 
 
Constitutional reasoning in this paper refers to a special type of legal reasoning, namely, a 
type of reasoning that uses arguments based on constitutional law in order to solve a case. 
The concept of “constitutional law” is, unfortunately, not as simple as it looks at first sight. 
(A) If constitutional law is defined as a legal document, or a group of documents, which is 
more difficult to amend than other, ordinary statutes, then organic laws may also fall into 
this category, expanding it too far. (B) If defined as the norms of the highest rank in a legal 
order on which the validity of all new norms is measured, then it could mean only the 
Ewigkeitsklausel (those provisions of the constitution that cannot be modified), thus 
narrowing the concept too much. (C) If following Kelsen, a constitution outlines the 
norm(s) that regulate(s) the creation of statutes, then the standing orders of parliaments 
would be part of the constitution, which does not conform to the usual understanding.
5
 (D) 
If the constitution is a norm or a bundle of norms that regulate the most important 
questions of a legal order—e.g., state organization and fundamental rights—then the 
definition would be very vague, as “most important” can be defined in very different 
manners. (E) And finally, if constitutions are those documents that bear the name 
constitution, then the Grundgesetz would fall outside of this category. Thus, a more 
sophisticated definition is needed. 
 
The present analysis will use the expression constitution in the sense of (F) “a norm or a 
group of norms that are of the highest rank in a legal order in the sense that the validity of 
all other norms is measured on them.” This definition is different from the above (B), 
because here we measure the validity of all other norms on the constitution, whereas in 
(B) we measured only the validity of new norms on the constitution. The difference is 
important, as we cannot measure the validity of the original, ordinary constitutional text 
on the Ewigkeitsklausel, which are formally part of this document, thus our new definition, 
(F), does not merge the concept of Ewigkeitsklausel with that of the constitution, but it 
simply conceives the Ewigkeitsklausel as part of the constitution. This definition also 
conforms to the usual use of the word constitution. 
 
                                                                                                                
arbitrarily. See Eike von Savigny, Methodologie der Dogmatik: Wissenschaftstheoretische Fragen, in JURISTISCHE 
DOGMATIK UND WISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE 7, 8 (Ulfrid Neumann ed., 1976). 
5 THEO ÖHLINGER, DER STUFENBAU DER RECHTSORDNUNG: RECHTSTHEORETISCHE UND IDEOLOGISCHE ASPEKTE 17 (1975). 
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By constitutional court, I mean the highest court of a legal order, whatever name they 
bear, which has as one of its tasks the adjudication of the validity of norms by reference to 
the constitution. In this sense, the United Kingdom (U.K.) does not have a constitution or a 
constitutional court,
6
 only something slightly similar: The Supreme Court, formerly the 
House of Lords, can declare statutes incompatible with the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) without quashing them.
7
 Thus, neither the scope, namely only 
human rights, nor the legal effect of such decisions fulfills the given definitional 
requirements. But for the sake of comparison, and because it is one of the traditionally 
expected reference points of comparative lawyers, the U.K. Supreme Court will be included 
in this paper. The Netherlands and, to a degree, Switzerland, are similar to the U.K. in the 
sense that they do not have a court that is able to quash federal statutes on the basis of 
unconstitutionality, and will, therefore, not be included in the comparison. 
 
In situations leading to constitutional court decisions there are three fundamental 
requirements: (A) The issue has to be decided, (B) the decision has to be sound, i.e., 
acceptable also from non-legal—e.g., political, social, moral, or economic—points of view, 
and (C) it also has to be acceptable from a legal point of view, i.e., traceable back to the 
constitution. Requirement (A) is not within the scope of the present paper,
8
 but (B) and (C) 
sometimes require considerable lawyerly efforts if they are to be met at the same time, 
and this is exactly what the present paper shall discuss. If taken separately, (B) and (C) can 
be fulfilled quite easily, but their simultaneous accomplishment may raise difficulties. 
Therefore, later parts of this paper will focus on how one can have a set of legal arguments 
which allows for the delivery of a sound decision—i.e., (B)—without being accused of 
departing from the constitution, as this would result in arbitrariness—i.e., (C) would not be 
accomplished. The problem here is that making a good decision in a non-legal, non-
lawyerly sense does not always qualify as a legal argument.
9
 One of the presuppositions of 
the present paper is that from a lawyerly point of view, there is quite often no single good 
decision—though sometimes there is—but that some of the possible, legally not absurd, 
decisions are socially, morally, etc., more acceptable, while others are less so. The problem 
can be conceptualized in two different ways: Either we can say that finding the legally most 
                                            
6 See F.F. Ridley, There is No British Constitution: A Dangerous Case of the Emperor’s Clothes, 41 PARLIAMENTARY 
AFF. 340–61 (1988). 
7 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 § 4 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/section/4. 
8 For such a problem, see the Spanish Constitutional Court’s inability to decide about the Statute of Catalonia for 
several years. See B.G.G, Cuatro años de encarnizada batalla política, EL PAÍS, Apr. 16, 2010, 
http://elpais.com/elpais/2010/04/16/actualidad/1271405842_850215.html. 
9 See András Jakab, What Makes a Good Lawyer? Was Magnaud Indeed Such a Good Judge?, 62 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT 275–87 (2007), (discussing purposive (teleological) reasoning as a bridge or a method 
facilitating the translation of non-legal considerations into legal ones. Teleological arguments are able to respond 
to new social challenges without modifying the text of the constitution). 
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acceptable decision sometimes involves subjective factors; or, if we work with a more 
positivistic concept of law—i.e., if we strictly differentiate between description and 
prescription as to the content of the law, then—we can admit that sometimes we choose 
the legally second best solution because of non-legal factors.
10
  
 
One of the theses of the present paper, which will be developed later, is that the presence 
of subjective factors is not a perversion of constitutional interpretation, but that the 
presence of subjective factors is a necessary feature. Thus, legal methodology is 
somewhere between complete, objective certainty and complete, subjective arbitrariness, 
as to the outcome of legal interpretation. The existence of debates in constitutional law 
may suggest that there is general disagreement among constitutional lawyers on the most 
important issues, and that the subjective factor plays a major role in constitutional 
interpretation. This, however, is a false impression; constitutional lawyers do agree on 
most problems, but do not discuss these, as it would be terribly boring to keep repeating 
each other. Moreover, the general, implicit and tacit, opinion of the professional 
community serves as an objective control mechanism on most questions, thus preventing 
arbitrariness. This paper reflects the conviction that one may indeed aim for more 
objectivity, which is required by the rule of law, and its conceptual component legal 
certainty; but, complete objectivity,
11
 like the axis of a hyperbola, can, and should, never 
be achieved. 
 
Legal norms in general, and the constitution, due to the abstract nature of its text, in 
particular, mostly allow for different interpretations.
12
 To use the words of Neil 
MacCormick: 
 
In short, rules can be ambiguous in given contexts, and 
can be applied in one way or the other only after the 
                                            
10 For a traditional positivist conceptualization separating sharply between the interpretation of the text and the 
actual legal decision as a choice from the different options offered by the interpretation, while criticizing Robert 
Alexy, Michel Troper, and Ronald Dworkin for not doing this separation, see Otto Pfersmann, Le sophisme 
onomastique: Changer au lieu connaître. L’interprétation da la Constitution, in L’INTERPRÉTATION CONSTITUTIONNELLE 
33–60 (Ferdinand Mélin-Soucramanien ed., 2005). If following this positivistic path, then the legal theoretical task 
becomes quite complicated: For the first, interpretative, step one also has to clarify precisely what should be 
interpreted, i.e., what the law is. See Otto Pfersmann, Ontologie des normes juridiques et argumentation, in 
RAISONNEMENT JURIDIQUE ET INTERPRÉTATION 11–34 (Otto Pfersmann & Gérard Timsit eds., 2001). Non-positivists, or 
non-traditional positivists, have it easier at this point, as they can avoid this hopelessly complicated ontological 
question. 
11 Here objectivity means the lack of arbitrariness, i.e., “it can be supported by arguments thought to be relevant 
which are independent from the person of the speaker/author of those arguments.” 
12 Different outcomes of different interpretations are called norm hypotheses (Normhypothesen). See, e.g., Karl 
Korinek, Zur Interpretation von Verfassungsrecht, in STAATSRECHT IN THEORIE UND PRAXIS. FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ROBERT 
WALTER 363, 367 (Heinz Mayer ed., 1991). 
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ambiguity is resolved. But resolving the ambiguity in 
effect involves choosing between rival versions of the 
rule . . . once that choice is made, a simple deductive 
justification of a particular decision follows. But a 
complete justification of that decision must hinge then 
on how the choice between the competing versions of 
the rule is justified.
 13
 
 
According to European legal traditions, any choice between these options has to be 
justified; one ought to argue for his or her decision.
14
 Such reasoning has to provide a, 
rational, justification for the solution chosen, on the one hand, and—partly overlapping 
this—convince, both rationally and emotionally, the audience, on the other.
15
 In the case 
of constitutional reasoning, the audience comprises of the whole political community, yet 
in practice it is limited, because of the expert knowledge needed to understand such 
reasoning, to the citizens who have at least some education in constitutional law. 
Therefore, reasoning is essentially addressed to the latter group: The decision-maker, a 
constitutional court, wants to show its audience, especially politicians and constitutional 
lawyers, that its decision was not an arbitrary one (or horribile dictu motivated by party 
politics). 
 
One may argue before the actual decision, i.e., searching open-mindedly for the best 
interpretation; but also after the decision is made, i.e., trying to persuade others about 
one’s decision, providing arguments supporting the decision already made. Thus 
constitutional reasoning can be both an honest endeavor to find the solution for the case, 
or it can be just an ideological mask to find support for a choice made well before the 
reasoning actually began. Different schools in legal theory place a stronger emphasis on 
one, or the other, of these phases, but this paper does not intend to take sides on this 
issue, and accepts both argumentative situations as possible. 
 
I. Constitutional Reasoning and Constitutional Interpretation 
 
It is important to briefly clarify the relationship between the concepts of interpretation and 
argumentation—the latter is used as synonymous throughout this article with reasoning. 
Interpretation, in the sense used here, means determining the content of a normative text. 
                                            
13 NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL THEORY 67–68 (1978). 
14 It was not always the case, the practice of the Middle Ages is very diverse from this point of view, see Tony 
Sauvel, Histoire du jugement motivé, 71 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 5–53 (1955). 
15 On the difference between convincing and justifying, see Eugenio Bulygin, Normative Positivism vs The Theory 
of Legal Argumentation, in LAW AND LEGAL CULTURES IN THE 21ST CENTURY. DIVERSITY AND UNITY 221, 224 (Tomasz 
Gizbert-Studnicki & Jerzy Stelmach eds., 2007). On convincing as the purpose of legal reasoning, see CHAÏM 
PERELMAN, LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE—NOUVELLE RHÉTORIQUE (1976). 
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This determination of content can be argued for, or against, with the help of arguments. 
Consequently, what is traditionally called “a method of interpretation,” is in fact a type of 
argument used to interpret a text. 
 
Most arguments in constitutional reasoning aim to interpret the constitution, even if 
sometimes they just presuppose its existence and debate about some logically secondary 
question—e.g., the interpretation of a precedent. There are three main exceptions where 
arguments are not interpretative in their nature: (1) Analogies; (2) establishing the text of 
the constitution; and (3) arguments about why the text of the constitution should or 
should not be applied. 
 
1. Analogies 
 
Analogies are used if there is a legal gap or lacuna and one wants to solve a problem not 
covered by the text of the constitution.
16
 There are two kinds of gaps, real and technical.
17
 
Technical gaps exist where the constitution itself raises a question, but fails to answer it—
e.g., a provision makes a reference to another provision, which does not exist.
18
 Real, or 
substantive, gaps, in turn, are found where a rule does not regulate a question, so from 
this would follow an obviously unacceptable legal solution (planwidrige Rechtslücke).
19
 The 
difficulty here is that what “obviously unacceptable” means is a question of evaluation. 
Therefore, if one claims that there is a substantive legal gap, his or her argument has to be 
supported by a reference to the objective ratio legis (C.III.1), the subjective intention of the 
constitution-maker (C.III.2), or to substantive—e.g., moral—arguments (C.III.3). For this 
reason, the use of an analogy without particularly firm reasoning to fill a substantive 
constitutional gap may run the risk of being accused of arbitrariness.
20
 Fear of such 
                                            
16 See, e.g., in the judgment by the Spanish constitutional court Nr. 36/82. 
17 See HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE 100–04 (1934); PAVEL HOLLÄNDER, VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE ARGUMENTATION—
ZWISCHEN DEM OPTIMISMUS UND DER SKEPSIS 107–08 (2007). 
18 See HEMKE KATJA, METHODIK DER ANALOGIEBILDUNG IM ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHT 43 (2006) (calling these Existenzlücke 
(“existence gap”)). 
19 Id. at 44 (calling these Relationslücke (“relation gap”), as they exist in relation to the legal system or its values as 
a whole). 
20 One way of escaping the charge of arbitrariness is trying to trace the substantive gap back to provisions of the 
normative text—e.g., to principles of the constitution, perhaps combined with particular provisions. A thorough 
argument—i.e., answering the possible counterarguments, especially of the types “Why this very provision?” and 
“Is there no other, more important principle that would suggest the use of analogy from another particular 
provision?”—is not used normally. 
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accusations may explain why in some legal cultures the use of analogies is not accepted at 
all,
21
 and general principles are referred to instead. 
 
The basic idea of analogy is to look for a rule containing provisions not exactly relevant for 
the case at hand, but relevant for cases similar to it—i.e., the accusation of arbitrariness 
can be rebutted by showing this “similarity” together with the “gap in law.” The more 
similar the case, the more convincing the analogy. The typical problems here, are (I) when 
a case can be regarded as “similar” to another and (II) which of two “similar” cases—being 
similar to ours in different aspects—is more similar. To answer these questions, 
teleological arguments may be of some help. 
 
A distinction well known in literature is the one between analogia legis and analogia 
iuris.
22
 The former means applying a particular, but not immediately relevant, norm of 
positive law, possibly not even of constitutional rank. While in the case of the latter, the 
norm to be applied is inferred from general principles not explicitly codified, which may be 
collected from several enactments.  
 
Analogy is not a method of interpretation, but rather the application of a rule, that of 
course has to be interpreted too in order to be applied, but actually does not cover the 
case. If one uses the analogous rule only for interpreting the rule one has to apply, then it 
is either a contextual/harmonizing argument (in pari materia, see below B.II.1) or an 
“interpretation in the light of doctrinal concepts and principles” (see below B.II.3). 
 
The inverse of analogy is teleological reduction (teleologische Reduktion): A norm that 
covers the case is not applied, as it would contradict a general principle, the objective ratio 
legis, or the subjective intention of the constitution-maker.
23
 
 
Making use of analogy may raise serious doubts in terms of its legality—as the case is 
admittedly not covered by the norm applied; or in the case of teleological reduction one 
fails to apply the relevant norm
24
—and is also likely to make the resulting interpretation 
unforeseeable, thus contradicting legal certainty; therefore, such arguments are usually 
                                            
21 For example, Verfassungsgerichtshof [VfGH] [Constitutional Court], Mar. 16, 1988, ERKENNTNISSE UND BESCHLÜSSE 
DES VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSHOFES [VFSLG] No. 11.663/1988 (Austria), demonstrates one of the usual rejections of the 
use of analogy by the Austrian constitutional court. 
22 See MIKLÓS SZABÓ, ARS JURIS. A JOGDOGMATIKA ALAPJAI 182–83 (2005). 
23 Cf. KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 391–95 (1991). Against teleological reduction for 
fundamental rights see BVerfGE 51, 97 (110). 
24 Teleological reduction, if used contrary to the statutes, may conceal a decentralized constitutional review. Its 
disadvantages are even worse as it is not even based on positive law, namely the constitution. For arguments 
against decentralized constitutional review, see Attila Vincze, Die unmittelbare Anwendbarkeit der ungarischen 
Verfassung, in 1 JAHRBUCH FÜR OSTRECHT 83–94 (2009). 
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avoided.
25
 The most acceptable situation for using analogies is that of technical legal 
gaps—provided that one’s argument is founded on positive law to the greatest extent 
possible—i.e., reference to several, concordant provisions of positive law made for similar 
cases. 
 
2. Establishing the Text of the Constitution 
 
The second type of non-interpretative constitutional arguments is about establishing the 
valid text of the constitution which is a preliminary question of interpretation. It can be 
difficult in times of revolutionary regime changes, when it is unclear whether the new 
constitution or the old one is valid, or also when constitutional amendments take place, 
where either the application of the unwritten lex posterior derogat legi priori rule might be 
the issue or some promulgation problem. 
 
3. Arguments on the Applicability of the Constitution 
 
The third type of non-interpretative constitutional arguments is about whether the valid 
constitution can be applied or not. This is again a preliminary question of interpretation. 
Arguments stating that some questions cannot be judged from a legal point of view, as 
they are too political so the constitution cannot be applied,
26
 or about the extra-legal 
nature of a state of emergency, belong to this category.
27
 The latter type of argumentation 
emphasizes that normativity presumes normality of circumstances.
28
 This implies “that 
norms only apply in normal situations and that the presumption of situational normality is 
a positive-law precondition of their applicability.”
29
 Thus, norms cannot bind the state in 
exceptional situations in which instead, the state, by necessity, has a right of self-
preservation. And, a norm cannot dispense with this necessary right of the state due to the 
                                            
25 This is the reason why most criminal law regimes forbid the use of analogy in disfavour of the defendant, see 
e.g. BVerfGE 92, 1. Similarly problematic is analogy if used by the state for any limitation of individual rights (e.g. 
in tax law or in administrative law), see e.g. BVerfGE 71, 108. 
26 For similar Jellinekian arguments, see GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 16–17 (1914) (Vorbehalt des 
“politisch Möglichen”); JELLINEK at 18 (Vermutung für die Rechtmäßgkeit der Handlungen der obersten 
Staatsorgane). For a convincing critique of the latter, see HANS KELSEN, VOM WESEN UND WERT DER DEMOKRATIE 80 
(1929). As soon as you try to find a base for such doctrines in the text of the constitution, these doctrines become 
issues of constitutional interpretation. Without this, they are rather just bold attempts to limit constitutionalism. 
27 For an overview of extra-, or pre-textual constitutional arguments, see András Jakab, German Constitutional 
Law and Doctrine on “State of Emergency”; Paradigms and Dilemmas of a Traditional (Continental) Discourse, 7 
GERMAN L.J. 453–78 (2006). 
28 See HERBERT KRÜGER, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 31 (2d ed. 1966); CARL SCHMITT, POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE 19 (2d ed. 1934).  
29 Carl Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität, in VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE AUFSÄTZE AUS DEN JAHREN 1924–1954 321 (1958). 
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very abnormality of exceptional situations.
30
 It is apparent that this line of reasoning has its 
basis in natural law, which provides for the state’s pre-positive right to existence
31
 (jus 
eminens).
32
 This right is not merely parallel to the constitution, but rather contrary to it,
33
 
because the constitution cannot apply, by definition, in an, abnormal, emergency 
situation.
34
 Therefore, this reasoning demands compliance with this positive law only 
insofar as it is consistent with the state’s right of existence. Thus, positive law’s normativity 
must be recognized only within the limits of this right of existence. This is generally the 
case with positive law, which is only to be recognized within the limits of natural law.
35
 The 
right of existence, although possibly contradictory to positive law, always continues to be 
directly exercisable, according to this logic.
36
 Thus, in this conceptualization, the 
normativity of constitutional regulation of a state of emergency always depends on 
uncodifiable pre-legal rules governing emergencies. 
 
Beyond these rare exceptions, the vast majority of arguments are interpretive in their 
nature. They have to be “rooted into the constitution” if the judge wants to avoid the risk 
of being accused of arbitrariness and unfounded argumentation. In the U.K., given the lack 
of such a document, constitutional reasoning is either simply missing in courts, especially 
                                            
30 The state is viewed as a pre-legal institution whose power is originally unlimited, and only tamed by the law. 
Even moderate state-centred theorists display this Schmittian viewpoint. See, e.g, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, 
Der verdrängte Ausnahmezustand, 31 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1885 (1978) 
31 See CARL FRIEDRICH WILHELM VON GERBER, GRUNDZÜGE DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS 42, margin n. 2 (3d ed. 1880) 
(“The recognition of emergency powers contains the idea of the state’s right of existence beyond its usual 
constitutional life, a right that appears in abnormal emergency circumstances”) (author’s translation); ERICH 
KAUFMANN, ZUR PROBLEMATIK DES VOLKSWILLENS 14 (1931) (“For the extreme case, an ultimate right of necessity 
exists, alongside standardized and formalized exceptional rights, in the unwritten, natural-law content of every 
body of constitutional law”) (author’s translation). See also RUDOLF VON JHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT 330 (8th ed. 
1923) (“As the individual human being, so too the state has a right of necessity when its existence is threatened”) 
(author’s translation). Or from antiquity, see CICERO, DE LEGIBUS III, at 3 (“Salus rei publicae suprema lex esto”). 
32 See Meinhard Schröder, Staatsrecht an den Grenzen des Rechtsstaates, ARCHIV DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 121, 132 
(1978) (detailing the history of the term jus eminens and citing further references). 
33 See KRÜGER, supra note 28, at 31 (“Emergency law, by its very concept, implies recourse to natural law as 
against positive law”) (author’s translation). See also KLAUS STERN, 2 DAS STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND 1336 (1980) (reasoning identically). 
34 See, e.g., GEORG MEYER & GERHARD ANSCHÜTZ, LEHRBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS 906 (7th ed. 1919) (“Only one 
thing is sure: the constitution does not intend, cannot intend . . . for the life of the state to stand still . . . Here, 
constitutional law ceases, and the inquiry . . . is no longer a legal inquiry”) (author’s translation). See also SCHMITT, 
supra note 28, at 11 (describing the supremacy of this right to existence over positive law: “Sovereign is whoever 
decides in the exceptional state”). Schmitt claims that positive law cannot bind this sovereign decision-making 
and this state of emergency. See CARL SCHMITT, DIE DIKTATUR: VON DEN ANFÄNGEN DES MODERNEN 
SOUVERÄNITÄTSGEDANKENS BIS ZUM PROLETARISCHEN KLASSENKAMPF IX (1921). 
35 See STERN, supra note 33, at 1334, 1337. 
36 Id. at 1337. 
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in the former House of Lords, today Supreme Court, like on matters of the relationship 
between the highest state organs, so the norms are conceptualized as non-legal 
constitutional conventions or limited to human rights issues as found in the ECHR (cf. 
Human Rights Act 1998). 
 
II. Constitutional Interpretation and Statutory Interpretation 
 
Constitutional interpretation is just a specific case of statutory interpretation. There is no 
need to draw a sharp distinction between these two types of interpretation.
37
 However, in 
general, there are two kinds of arguments for a sharp distinction between the two: (a) The 
constitution is “political law” (Verfassungsrecht als politisches Recht), thus it is substantially 
different from other norms of non-constitutional rank; or (b) the norms of the constitution 
are much more abstract and/or value-laden than the rather concrete statutory norms.
38
  
 
Ad (a). The first argument is dangerous from the perspective of the rule of law on the one 
hand, as it places some questions outside the scope of judicial review, and on the other 
hand, it fails to recognize that statutes below constitutional rank may also have “political” 
content. Referring to the political nature of constitutions in order to depart from the usual 
country-specific methods of statutory interpretation is mostly just a way of removing some 
kind of political activity from constitutional or judicial control, or supporting an 
interpretation of the constitution which cannot be justified by any of the methods of 
interpretation, as it rests on the arbitrary, maybe party political preferences. Thus such 
arguments are hard to reconcile with the rule of law, they should rather be avoided.
39
 
 
Ad (b). Referring to the different nature of norms is likewise mistaken, as it does not take 
into account the fact that general clauses in civil codes are at least as abstract and/or 
value-laden as the provisions of the constitutions concerning fundamental rights, and that 
constitutions also contain a number of rather concrete—e.g., procedural—rules. True, 
constitutions contain abstract and general provisions in a greater proportion, but this only 
means that one has to use certain methods more frequently. 
 
The vast literature on constitutional interpretation, which is bigger than the literature on 
any other particular norm in the legal order, like civil codes or criminal codes, is due to the 
higher stakes at issue, and not due to an entirely different legal nature. The stakes are 
higher because the interpretation often concerns the institutional structure of society and 
                                            
37 On constitutional interpretation using basically the general methods of statutory interpretation, with certain 
differences in degree, see Ernst Forsthoff, Die Umbildung des Verfassungsgesetzes, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR CARL SCHMITT 
ZUM 70 GEBURTSTAG 35, 36 (Hans Barion et al. eds., 1959). 
38 See the description and convincing refutation of these arguments by MARÍA LUISA BALAGUER CALLEJÓN, 
INTERPRETACIÓN DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN Y ORDENAMIENTO JURÍDICO 39–40 (1997). 
39 See WERNER KÄGI, DIE VERFASSUNG ALS RECHTLICHE GRUNDORDNUNG DES STAATES 65–66, 120 (1945). 
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the political power, and also because the lawmaker cannot as easily correct judicial 
interpretation in the same way as it can ordinary statutes. 
 
The sharp difference in terms of nature is thus rather a myth, and moreover, a harmful 
one, as it would place constitutional review beyond the traditional limits of 
Verfassungsdogmatik, thus making it more difficult to control. Over-emphasizing the 
difference can serve two purposes: (1) A rhetorical tool used to make constitutional 
interpretation look mystical and complex, thus making the author or the court look very 
smart; or (2) escaping from the control of usual methods, thus being able to smuggle one’s 
own moral preferences masked as the result of some special kind of interpretation. The 
methods of constitutional interpretation are thus not different from the methods of 
statutory interpretation, only the emphasis placed on the specific methods and the 
frequency of their use are different.  
 
Such gradual differences can be explained by the fact that constitutions are more difficult 
to amend, thus judges have to interpret constitutions often in a more creative way to 
adjust them to new challenges. Also the degree of generality of constitutional provisions is 
on average higher than that of statutory provisions, which again indicates a higher 
probability for creative—i.e., non-literal—interpretation. But this difference is, again, just 
gradual. 
 
In some legal orders though, there does exist a sharp difference between the style of 
argumentation in ordinary courts, on the one hand, and that in the constitutional court, on 
the other. This can mostly be explained by different positive legal rules on how judgments 
should be delivered in the different courts—e.g., whether dissenting opinions are possible 
or not. It is also usual that the ratio of university professors or former politicians is higher 
among constitutional court judges, which influences their typical arguments—e.g., 
whether they rely on arguments of public morality or of legal scholarship. In some 
constitutional courts the locus standi rules—e.g., the requirement of claiming the violation 
of a fundamental right—make it more likely that the ratio of fundamental rights cases will 
be higher, thus usual arguments about fundamental rights—e.g., proportionality tests—
will also be more likely to appear. Different locus standi rules—e.g., actio popularis, in 
which no fundamental rights violations have to be claimed, constitutional grievances can 
be conceptualized with the help of general principles, like rule of law or democracy
40
—
however, can make such differences diminish. 
 
                                            
40 In Europe, there are currently four constitutional courts where actio popularis exists: Bavaria, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Macedonia. In Croatia, there is a similar type of popular claim, but the constitutional court is 
not obliged to begin the procedure. See BERND WIESER, VERGLEICHENDES VERFASSUNGSRECHT 140 (2005). In Hungary, 
the actio popularis was abolished by the end of 2011, and the new constitution introduced a German-type 
constitutional complaint in which the violation of a fundamental right has to be claimed. 
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The differences between the style of argumentation in ordinary courts and that in 
constitutional courts do not follow from the “nature” of constitutional interpretation as 
such, they are usual accidental features, which in some countries do exist, and in others do 
not. 
 
III. The Structure of Arguments 
 
There are three general types of legal argumentative structures: (A) Deploying one 
conclusive argument, or a chain of arguments following from one another; (B) cumulative-
parallel arguments or a reasoning like “the legs of a chair”
41
—several arguments support a 
certain legal interpretation independently; every argument would suffice on its own, but 
there are more of them;
42
 or (C) mentioning only relevant factors, any of which is not 
conclusive, but if taken together, they provide a certain solution—discursive or dialogic 
style; making use of topoi.
43
 The most transparent is (A), the least (C); depending on the 
legal culture, different structures are preferred.
44
 
 
Legal argumentation is usually enthymematic in structure—i.e., not all the steps are 
explained, but some of them are only implied, or based on implied premises.
45
 What we 
find in judicial decisions is therefore necessarily only a sketch or abbreviation of all 
arguments; only those steps are analyzed which are susceptible to debate. 
 
IV. The Need for Clarifying the Methods of Interpretation 
 
                                            
41 WILLIAM TWINING & DAVID MIERS, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH RULES: A PRIMER OF INTERPRETATION 268 (1982) (following 
John Wisdom, Gods, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 185, 185–194 (1944)). In the original text of Wisdom, 
the phrase “legs of a chair” also implied that single arguments are not conclusive, but if we used the expression in 
this sense here, we could not distinguish between this type and that of topical reasoning. We therefore use the 
phrase in a sense slightly different from the original (i.e. for a reasoning in which every argument is conclusive in 
itself). 
42 See e.g., Dec. Hung. CC 41/2005. (X. 27.) AB, ABH 2005, 459, 502 (László Kiss, dissenting). 
43 See THEODOR VIEHWEG, TOPIK UND JURISPRUDENZ (1953). On the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court sometimes accepting this argument, see criticism by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Die Methoden der 
Verfassungsinterpretation, 46 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2089, 2092–94 (1976).  
44 The third, topical pattern of argumentation is more frequent in German constitutional review, but, e.g. is hardly 
ever used in Hungary, see András Jakab, Az Alkotmány kommentárjának feladata, in AZ ALKOTMÁNY KOMMENTÁRJA 
margin n. 5 (András Jakab ed., 2d ed. 2009). A convincing set of arguments against it, namely that it is unclear, 
uncontrollable, and leads to arbitrary and unpredictable decisions, see ULRICH KARPEN, AUSLEGUNG UND ANWENDUNG 
DES GRUNDGESETZES 54–55 (1987), with further references. 
45 See Franz Horak, Zur rechtstheoretischen Problematik der Begründung, in DIE ENTSHEIDUNGSBEGRÜNDUNG IN 
EUROPÄISCHEN VERFAHRENSRECHTEN UND IM VERFAHREN VOR INTERNATIONALEN GERICHTEN 9, 14-15. (Rainer Sprung ed., 
1974). 
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The methods of interpretation are norms themselves: Norms about how norms ought to 
be interpreted.
46
 Normally they are uncodified, they follow only from the specific legal 
culture in which they are used and in which they are considered as obvious truths, at least 
among those who did not do comparative law. Codification of the methods of 
interpretation arises normally only if the legislator, more specifically, the constitution-
maker, wants to change the traditionally cultivated, and sometimes even unspoken, 
presuppositions about the methods of interpretation. For example, after the downfall of 
internationally isolated nationalist dictatorships, a typical answer of the new democratic 
constitution-maker can be to rely explicitly on international law as an aid of constitutional 
interpretation, especially concerning human rights, as this happened in Spain and 
Portugal.
47
 
 
Another example where the constitution-maker regulated the interpretation of the 
constitution is Article R of the Hungarian Basic Law of 2011: “(3) The provisions of the Basic 
Law shall be interpreted in accordance with their purposes, with the Avowal of National 
Faith contained therein, and with the achievements of our historical constitution.” It lists 
three methods: The objective teleological method (“in accordance with their purpose”), 
interpretation in light of the preamble (called “National Avowal”), and interpretation in 
light of the “achievements of our historical constitution.” It defines then in Article 28 what 
the expression purpose means: “When interpreting the Basic Law or legal rules, it shall be 
presumed that they serve moral and economical purposes which are in accordance with 
common sense and the public good.” 
 
The second method, “National Avowal,” is considered as being named superfluously, as 
preambles are always used to help the interpretation of constitutions.
48
 The third method, 
“historical constitution,” is considered either as legally inoperable and serving only 
purposes of historicizing political rhetoric, or as referring to the past case law of the 
Constitutional Court which was used as an aid of interpretation anyway.
49
 The explicit 
reference to the objective teleological method was necessary because of the socialist 
legacy of interpretation, mainly in ordinary courts, which had to be broken (see below pp. 
1243, 1272), the two others were mentioned only for political reasons. 
                                            
46 Jerzy Wróblewski, Legal Reasoning in Legal Interpretation, 12 LOGIQUE ET ANALYSE 3, 7 (1969).  
47 See art. 16(2) Constitution of Portugal: ‘The provisions of the Constitution and laws relating to fundamental 
rights are to be read and interpreted in harmony with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ and art. 10(2) 
Constitution of Spain: ‘The norms relative to basic rights and liberties which are recognised by the Constitution 
shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international treaties 
and agreements on those matters ratified by Spain.’ 
48 On the Hungarian traditions of interpretive preambles, see Márton Sulyok & László Trócsányi, Preambulum, in 
JAKAB, supra note 44, at 91. See generally Liav Orgad, The Preamble in Constitutional Interpretation, 8 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 714–38 (2010).  
49 András Jakab & Pál Sonnevend, Continuity with Deficiencies: The New Basic Law of Hungary 9 EUROPEAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 102, 108-109 (2013). 
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None of these provisions, however, contain all the methods, they do not contain the word 
“only” when listing the methods; some obvious ones, like the literal interpretation, are 
missing, and they do not give any ranking of the listed methods. A constitution, by its 
nature, cannot contain handbook of its own interpretation. A detailed guide can only be 
delivered by legal scholarship. But why should we have a detailed guide at all? 
 
Because it means a standard on which we can measure the judges and their decisions. 
Having such a standard is a “soft manner” of controlling their power, which at the same 
time conforms to the idea of judicial independence. Such scholarly critique can be 
especially effective on those judges who are legal scholars. Beyond scholarly critique, 
another way to control judges’ power is to use judges of the same court; to allow them to 
write minority opinions and to criticize the majority opinions as equals “from inside” the 
judicial branch. 
 
Interpretation inevitably does involve subjective factors, or to put it more mildly, factors 
that lawyers cannot determine objectively with their traditional legal doctrinal methods; if 
this was not the case, legal interpretation could be counted out similarly to a mathematical 
or logical problem, and there would only be one correct interpretation in every case.
50
 
Very often there is no “single right solution,” just better or worse solutions.
51
 
Interpretation is, however, not mathematics and the reason why minority opinions are 
allowed by several courts, including constitutional courts, throughout the world. A minority 
opinion does not, necessarily, mean that the respective judge made a mistake, that the 
judge was not properly trained, or misinterpreted the law—even though this can also 
happen. A majority decision mostly means only that another interpretation was considered 
more convincing by the greater part of the judges. 
 
The introduction of the institution of concurring and dissenting opinions in constitutional 
courts reveals the dilemmas; it shows that the law is not straightforward and that the 
constitutional court judge is not simply “the mouth-piece of the law [or of the 
constitution],” as Montesquieu put it.
52
 Moreover, this institution raises the quality of 
                                            
50 On the (failed) attempt of Leibniz, aiming at this, see Fritjof Haft, Recht und Sprache, in EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE 
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE UND RECHTSTHEORIE DER GEGENWART 233, 278 (Arthur Kaufmann & Winfried Hassemer eds., 2006); 
BENOÎT FRYDMAN, LE SENS DES LOIS. HISTOIRE DE L’INTERPRÉTATION ET DE LA RAISON JURIDIQUE 274–77 (2005). 
51 This is also self-understanding of the German Federal Constitutional Court, see BVerfGE 82, 30 (38f). 
52 This makes the style of European continental constitutional court judgments normally more discursive than that 
of ordinary courts, where normally there is no dissenting opinion, see e.g., Lech Morawski & Marek Zirk-Sadowski, 
Precedent in Poland, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS. A COMPARATIVE STUDY 225 (Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers 
eds., 1997). On the institution of dissenting opinions in constitutional courts, see Katalin Kelemen, The Road from 
Common Law to East-Central Europe, in LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY IN THE POST-NATIONAL AGE 135–52 (Péter Cserne 
& Miklós Könczöl eds., 2011). 
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reasoning, since those delivering a concurring reasoning or dissenting opinion have to 
explain why they do not agree with the majority—and, in turn, those drawing the majority 
opinion have to deal with the embarrassing situation in front of the professional audience 
that a fellow judge is picking to pieces their argument in his dissenting opinion; as is 
happening de facto at times. Certainly one could cite counter-examples, when the majority 
opinion was not troubled at all, but on the whole its positive influence on the quality of 
constitutional reasoning is incontestable. 
 
The inevitable subjective factors are to be minimized as far as possible, but full elimination 
is both impossible and undesirable.
53
 Accordingly, the text has to be massaged, with 
methods of interpretation, until it provides a solution in a given case. The choice between 
these methods cannot eliminate subjective factors,
54
 but (A) the decision has to be traced 
back to the text, and (B) supported with arguments. 
 
The reason for this is that the text has stronger legitimacy than the judge—in cultures 
respecting the rule of law. For the text is usually shaped through more transparent steps of 
procedure and in closer relation to the bearer of popular sovereignty—i.e., the people 
themselves, or organs representing the people—than judicial decision-making, which, 
according to its mandate, should be based on the text anyway.
55
 
 
One of the means of minimizing the subjective factor is to review the methods, or canons, 
of legal—statutory or constitutional—interpretations.
56
 The following will give such a 
review, with the disclaimer that the acceptance of any specific method differs strongly 
between legal systems.
57
 In part D of this article, we will return to the problem of country-
specificity. 
 
                                            
53 Even within the subjective factors, one can distinguish legitimate (e.g. a different conception of democracy) and 
illegitimate (e.g. party allegiance) ones. The former may be referred to in an argument, while the latter may not. 
See Ralf Dreier, Zur Problematik und Situation der Verfassungsinterpretation, in RECHT MORAL IDEOLOGIE. STUDIEN ZUR 
RECHTSTHEORIE 126 (1981). 
54 This is reflected in an exaggerated form by the lawyerly adage cited by Schneider: “Tell me who is interpreting 
the norm and I tell you what it means.” Hans-Peter Schneider, Verfassungsinterpretation aus theoretischer Sicht, 
in VERFASSUNGSRECHT ZWISCHEN WISSENSCHAFT UND RICHTERKUNST. KONRAD HESSE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 39 (Hans-Peter 
Schneider & Rudolf Steinberg eds., 1990). 
55 Judicial procedures themselves are transparent, but how they shape the interpretation of statutes or 
constitutions is very far from transparent, only in the rarest case we find an explicit change of former case-law. 
56 The idea of narrowing down the circle of acceptable arguments to a canon, stems from ancient Rome, and is 
alien to Asian or African legal cultures, see Tony Honoré, Legal Reasoning in Rome and Today, 91 S. AFR. L.J. 92 
(1974).  
57 The discussion of the methods follows Robert S. Summers & Michele Taruffo, Interpretation and Comparative 
Analysis, in INTERPRETING STATUTES 461, 464–65 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991). 
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B. A Scheme of the Specific Methods of Interpretation 
 
In the following, a scheme of specific methods of interpretation will be given. This is meant 
to be a general conceptual frame, which on the one hand, helps us to understand issues of 
constitutional interpretation through examples while showing general theoretical features, 
but on the other hand, can be used when describing the different style of constitutional 
reasoning in part D of this article. 
 
The following scheme of specific methods of interpretation is not entirely exhaustive, but it 
does contain the vast majority of arguments and it does contain all binding arguments that 
are methodologically acceptable. Many other, methodologically unacceptable and unusual 
arguments can be imagined—e.g., “the Court was bribed yesterday to decide so,” “my 
spouse told me to quash the statute,” or “it is usual factual political practice, thus it is 
allowed by constitutional law”—which we do not list in a separate category. Among non-
binding arguments, some more types of arguments are possible, like referring to legal 
history in the same manner as referring to comparative law—e.g., as an inventory of ideas 
or in order to show that the question was well considered, but not as a decisive argument 
(see below B.IV.2)—but they seemed to be rather rare and are, therefore, not included. 
 
The argumentation on the choice of interpretation is carried out on two levels: (A) On the 
one hand, it is about the interpretation according to the various methods discussed below, 
and (B) on the other, it is about which of those arguments one should use or which of the 
different interpretations, obtained by different methods, one ought to adopt in a particular 
case (meta-argumentation). As for the latter, there is no exact and general rule or “a 
ranking of methods of interpretation,” only an approximate one as outlined above;
58
 the 
subjective factor—i.e., personal conviction of the person interpreting the text—cannot be 
eliminated. Yet a certain limit is imposed by the interpretational views of the professional 
community of constitutional lawyers of the respective country.
59
 These limits can always 
be stretched carefully, yet they cannot be completely neglected—without running the risk 
of being accused of an arbitrary decision, which thereby threatens legal certainty.
60
 The 
popularity of specific methods differs by legal cultures. 
                                            
58 With a focus on German and American preferences in methodology, see David M. Beatty, The Forms and Limits 
of Constitutional Interpretation, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 79–120 (2001). The American ranking of methods: (A) 
Precedents, (B) textualist and originalist arguments, and (C) others, is discussed by Richard H. Fallon, A 
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189–1286 (1987). 
59 Fish calls these supplementary norms of the interpretive community, into which the new members, in our case 
young lawyers at the beginning of their careers, are “socialized.” STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: 
CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 133 (1989). 
60 This kind of limit works only if the “web of beliefs in the legal community” clearly shows the solution to the 
given, easy, case; if, however, views on the problem diverge or there are no views yet, it being a new problem, 
then it is a hard case. See STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 125–43 (1985). 
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A technique of simplification, rather than a method of interpretation, is that of reasoning 
from hypotheticals, thus it will not be included in the scheme of methods.
61
 Reasoning 
from hypotheticals means that one argues for a certain interpretation in a given case by (A) 
constructing a simpler case instead of the complicated one that has to be decided, (B) 
which, in turn, cannot be distinguished from our case in terms of the actual legal issue. 
Then the solution obtained can be applied to the complicated original, real, case. 
 
I. The Ordinary or (Legal or Non-Legal) Technical Meaning of the Words 
 
This method essentially focuses on the dictionary meaning or ordinary meaning (sens 
courant),
62
 relying on grammatical, or orthographic, rules.
63
 The approach that prefers this 
method is usually called the textualist approach.
64
 It is also referred to as “grammatical 
interpretation,” and often used if a constitutional court wants to decide the question 
without examining other methods.
65
 In the U.K., the rule providing for reference to this 
method is called the literal rule, in the U.S. it is the plain meaning rule. A special form of 
this method is used when arguments are made not from the current ordinary meaning, but 
from the ordinary meaning at the time when the respective words were included in the 
constitution.
66
 In American constitutional law, the latter is termed original meaning. 
Antonin Scalia, the foremost advocate of historical-grammatical arguments in 
contemporary American jurisprudence, describes this method as follows, distinguishing it 
from another historical originalist method of interpretation—namely, the subjective 
teleological one: 
 
                                            
61 See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 99–103 (1988). 
62 E.g., BVerfGE 92, 130 (134); 102, 26 (39).. 
63 The technical meaning is that used by some particular community—e.g., lawyers—as opposed to the whole of 
the society. See Susan J. Brison & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, A Philosophical Introduction to Constitutional 
Interpretation, in CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1, 5 (Susan J. Brison & Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong eds., 1993). An idiosyncratic terminology makes the text more difficult to understand, but it 
improves its clarity and thus, contributes to legal certainty. 
64 One of the most influential formulations of the textualist theory is John F. Manning, Textualism as a 
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673–739 (1997) (supporting his theory by arguments of legitimacy). 
Richard Posner’s contrary theory of “pragmatic judgement”—i.e., it is only the best solution of the actual case and 
the filling of legal gaps that one has to aim for—is critically discussed by Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 910–13 (2002–03), with detailed references. 
65 See e.g., Dec. Hung. CC 1/1999. (II. 24.) AB, ABH 1999, 25, 37. 
66 See Mark Tushnet, The United States: Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS. A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 28 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2006). 
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The theory of originalism treats a constitution like a 
statute, and gives it the meaning that its words were 
understood to bear at the time they were promulgated. 
You will sometimes hear it described as the theory of 
original intent. You will never hear me refer to original 
intent, because as I say I am first of all a textualist, and 
secondly an originalist. If you are a textualist, you don't 
care about the intent, and I don't care if the framers of 
the Constitution had some secret meaning in mind 
when they adopted its words. I take the words as they 
were promulgated to the people of the United States, 
and what is the fairly understood meaning of those 
words.
 67
 
 
Arguments referring to the grammatical interpretation presume that the norms, in our 
case, the constitutional provisions, have been drafted without errors—i.e., they expressed 
everything, and exactly in the way they were meant to—being aware of all grammatical 
rules and the meaning of words.
68
 Yet, even if these conditions are met, which is not 
always the case, such a grammatical interpretation does not always offer an unambiguous 
result.
69
 The reason for this is partly the vagueness of natural languages, partly that certain 
questions may be kept open deliberately,
70
 or the emergence of new problems, which the 
constitution-maker could by no means foresee, even in the course of an otherwise perfect 
codification (technical development). 
 
A special problem arises, if the text of the constitution has several official language 
versions. The obvious solution for such situations is to give precedence to one specific 
language version, like Article 25(4)(6) of the Irish Constitution does: “[I]n case of conflict 
between the English and the Irish version of a law, including laws amending the 
Constitution, the Irish version shall prevail.” The other solution, chosen by the EU, gives all 
                                            
67 Antonin Scalia, A Theory of Constitution Interpretation, Remarks at the Catholic University of America (Oct. 18, 
1996), available at http://www.proconservative.net/pcvol5is225scaliatheoryconstlinterpretation.shtml. For a 
convincing collection of anti-originalist arguments [in essence: (a) the constitution has to develop, (b) yet it is 
difficult to amend, (c) therefore it has to be adapted to the changing circumstances through interpretation] is 
given (under the heading open ended modernism), see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987). 
68 See PIERRE-ANDRÉ CÔTÉ, INTERPRÉTATION DES LOIS 240 (1990). 
69 See the convincing examples in Glanville Williams, 61 Language and the Law, LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 71–86, 179–
95, 293–303, 384–406 (1945); Glanville Williams, 62 Language and the Law, LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 387–406 
(1946). 
70 See CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 31–32 (1928) (calling this dilatorischer Formelkompromiß, i.e., when the 
solution of a question is delayed, and placed to courts by formulating the norm very vaguely). 
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language versions of the founding treaties equal relevance—even if it is practically quite 
difficult to conform to this.
71
 
 
II. Systemic Arguments: Arguments from the Legal Context  
 
These arguments do not concentrate on the text of a legal provision on its own, unlike the 
previously mentioned group, but refer to other legal provisions, legal acts (including 
judicial decisions), legal principles, and general legal concepts in order to determine its 
meaning. If there is no relevant provision, one may argue for a legal solution from the very 
lack of a legal provision using linguistic-logical formulae. These arguments are united by 
their focus on the legal context and presuppose that law is a coherent and complete 
system (for more detail on these presuppositions see below in C.I). 
 
1. Arguments from the Context, or Harmonizing Arguments 
 
Contextual harmonizing arguments support a certain interpretation by referring to other 
legal norms.
72
 Legal norms may be a rule from within the same legal act—i.e., from the 
constitutional document, perhaps a definition among the interpretative provisions or a 
heading of the constitution
73
—or a provision from another document of equal 
constitutional rank—e.g., the American principle of in pari materia.
74
 Constitutional 
interpretation may conform to a norm higher in rank of the same legal order—e.g., 
interpreting constitutional provisions in the light of an Ewigkeitsklausel or of a basic 
principle of the constitution which is more difficult to amend than ordinary constitutional 
law
75
—or to rules of another legal order imposing duties on the legal order concerned—
e.g., interpreting the national constitutional law in accordance with EU law (so called 
                                            
71 283/81 CILFIT [1982] ECR 3415 para 23-27; Joxerramon Bengoetxea, Multilingual and Multicultural Legal 
Reasoning: The European Court of Justice, in LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY 97–122 (Anne Lise Kjær 
& Silvia Adamo eds., 2011); MATTIAS DERLÉN, MULTILINGUAL INTERPRETATION OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2009). 
72 See e.g., BVerfGE 62, 1 (35, 38ff, 44); 69, 1, 57 (61). Documents containing informal interpretations—e.g., 
explanatory notes by the ministries—are not like this, as they are not legal acts. Their use is forbidden in Hungary 
for reasons of legal certainty, see Dec. Hung. CC 37/2001 (X. 11.) AB, ABH 2001, 302, 305, with further references.  
73 This is called intrinsic aid in English scholarship. Extrinsic aid, in turn, refers to other legal acts or scholarly 
works, or even parliamentary materials. See e.g., ALISDAIR A. GILLESPIE, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 43–50 (2007). 
74 With reference to constitutional law, see CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 21–22 (1982). 
75 See e.g., VfSlg 11.829/1988, 11.927/1988, 16.327/2001. When interpreting statutes below the rank of the 
constitution, the usual form of this type of argument is the interpretation in the light of the constitution. See, 
HARALD BOGS, DIE VERFASSUNGSKONFORME AUSLEGUNG VON GESETZEN (1966); JOACHIM BURMEISTER, DIE 
VERFASSUNGSORIENTIERUNG DER GESETZESAUSLEGUNG (1966); PETER RAISCH, JURISTISCHE METHODEN. VOM ANTIKEN ROM BIS 
ZUR GEGENWART 179–80 (1995), with further references. A statutory interpretation in the light of the constitution is 
essentially a presumption of the validity, constitutionality, of the statute, see Tobias van Reenen, Tendences 
actuelles dans l’interprétation de la Constitution de l’Afrique du Sud, 2 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 
355, 360–61 (2002). 
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indirect effect of EU law) or with international law.
76
 In the case of enumerations, English-
speaking countries use the principles of noscitur a sociis (the unknown may be known from 
its companions)
77
 and eiusdem generis (of the same kind).
78
 Here also belongs the well-
known principle of exceptio est strictissimae interpretationis
79
—i.e., the strict 
interpretation of exceptions. 
 
Special contextual arguments of German constitutional law are the Prinzip der Einheit der 
Verfassung (principle of the unity of the constitution—i.e., particular constitutional 
provisions have to be interpreted in accordance with the other constitutional provisions)
80
 
and praktische Konkordanz (conflicts of general provisions [principles] have to be decided 
by “practical reconciliation”—i.e., finding some compromise, rather than on an all-or-
nothing approach).
81
 In American jurisprudence, advocates of holistic interpretation use a 
modified version of this argument by claiming that in the interpretation of legal texts later 
amendments have greater weight than earlier ones, as older parts have to be interpreted 
in the light of more recent ones, and not vice versa.
82
 
 
A historical version of contextual harmonizing arguments is the Versteinerungstheorie 
(petrification theory) of Austrian constitutional law. This means that, as a general rule, the 
                                            
76 On the principle of völkerrechtskonforme Auslegung as part of the interpretation according to the general 
hierarchy, see ERNST ZELLER, AUSLEGUNG VON GESETZ UND VERTRAG 372 (1989). In the U.S., this general principle is 
known as the “Charming Betsy” canon, after the first case where it was deployed: The Schooner Charming Betsy, 
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). An excellent analysis of the topic is Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and 
Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479–537 (1998). On 
international law arguments used in constitutional interpretation in American constitutional law, see Gerald L. 
Newman, The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 82–90 (2004). On the 
fact that the influence of Strasbourg jurisprudence on national constitutional law is similar to that of the U.S. 
Supreme Court on the practice of the states, see Gerda Kleijkamp, Comparing the Application and Interpretation 
of the United States Constitution and The European Convention on Human Rights, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 307–34 (2002). 
77 The meaning of a word, particularly in enumerations, can be determined with the help of the words adjacent to 
it. See ANTIEAU, supra note 74, at 22–23. 
78 If words of specific meaning are followed by a more general expression in a list, then the latter has to be 
understood as a broader expression having a meaning similar to those of the preceding specific words. In an 
enumeration like “cars, vans and other vehicles,” the word “vehicle” cannot mean ship or bicycle, only land motor 
vehicles. See PETER GOODRICH, READING THE LAW: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL METHOD AND TECHNIQUES 110 (1986). 
79 In another formulation: exceptiones non extendendae, see ALEKSANDER PECZENIK, ON LAW AND REASON 399 (1989). 
80 E.g. BVerfGE 19, 206 (220); 55, 274 (300) with further references. An example from Hungarian practice is the 
Dec. Hung. CC 48/1991. (IX. 26.) AB, ABH 1991, 217, 242.   
81 KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZÜGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 28 (1999). 
82 Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v Blitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L. REV. 
1259–1310 (2001). This doctrine, however, is not yet accepted by the courts, only a scholarly opinion. 
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words describing the division of competences between the federal and the state level have 
to be interpreted according to the meaning they had in the statutes then in force, at the 
time they were incorporated into the text of the constitution.
83
 Later changes of definitions 
in statutes, or at an even lower level, are not relevant to the interpretation.
84
 
 
A special case of contextual harmonizing arguments is inferring the meaning of the 
constitutional provision from its place within the constitution.
85
 E.g., we can argue that a 
constitutional provision looking like a fundamental right is not a fundamental right, as it is 
not in the chapter of the constitution on fundamental rights. 
 
2. Referring to Precedents Which Interpret the Constitution 
 
In order to establish what the text of the constitution says, one may also refer to past 
decisions of the constitutional court interpreting the constitution.
86
 The question is, then, 
whether single decisions can be taken as conclusive arguments or whether it is only an 
established practice (a series of past decisions or jurisprudence constante) that qualifies as 
such.
87
 Another question is whether in the case of contradictory jurisprudence the more 
recent or rather the older decisions should prevail.
88
 In some countries precedents have a 
formal binding force (common law),
89
 in others only a, sometimes very strong, persuasive 
value. 
 
                                            
83 For classical formulations, see VfSlg 4349/1963, 4680/1964, 11.503/1987. It differs from references to the 
American original meaning, see supra sec. B.I., to the extent that here the meaning is inferred from other legal 
rules, while there is no such limit in the case of the original meaning. 
84 See e.g., FELIX ERMACORA, ÖSTERREICHISCHE VERFASSUNGSLEHRE 96 (1998). This kind of argument is not unknown to 
the BVerfG either, see BVerfGE, 7, 29 (44); BVerfGE, 33, 125 (152 f.); BVerfGE, 42, 20 (29); BVerfGE, 61, 149 (175); 
BVerfGE, 68, 319 (328), but it is used as a less strict and conclusive argument.  
85 On the problem in general, with reference to statutes, see ROLF WANK, DIE AUSLEGUNG VON GESETZEN 80–90 (2005). 
86 The school of American constitutional interpretation focusing on such arguments is called “doctrinalist,” see 
WALTER F. MURPHY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 405–10 (2003). 
87 Cf. I EDGAR REINERS, DIE NORMENHIERARCHIE IN DEN MITGLIEDSTAATEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 275–76 (1971). 
Most constitutional courts consider “established practice” stronger, since if it was otherwise, they would quote 
the most recent decision only, however they usually quote several decisions if available. 
88 In the U.K., in case of contradictory precedents, the judge is free to choose amongst them. See Young v. Bristol 
Aeroplane Co Ltd, (1944) 1 K.B. 718. 
89 Also common law countries differ in whether a court binds itself for the future by a decision, or whether it only 
binds courts lower in the hierarchy. The latter is the case in the U.S., the former, with the exception of the House 
of Lords, today’s Supreme Court in the U.K. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 118–27 (1987). 
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The principle justifying that we follow precedents is that similar cases ought to be decided 
in a similar way. The question here is what “similar” means. Ordinary, not constitutional, 
courts usually define similar as having the same material facts. In the case of constitutional 
review, this means that the norm to be interpreted has the same content from the 
relevant constitutional perspective.
90
 If it does not, then the previous decision does not 
have to be followed, so the current case can be distinguished from the earlier case. In 
certain cases, however, the court, while acknowledging the identity of the relevant aspects 
of the cases, does not follow the previous decision for reasons of social changes, which 
took place in the meantime, or by simply stating that it was mistaken in its earlier decision, 
thus creating a new precedent (overruling).
91
 
 
A limit to the latter is set by legal certainty—which in our case means that citizens should 
be able to have trust in the stability of the legal system and that the constitutional court is 
going to overrule its previous decisions only if there are very strong reasons for doing so.
92
 
Moreover, as the constitutional court is the main organ protecting the constitution, or 
expressed in another way, the primary guardian of the constitution, it has to use higher 
standards than other courts when judging itself. A possibility of overruling can be 
reasonably considered where the social circumstances have undergone rather serious 
changes—i.e., new facts have emerged, which the court could not possibly take into 
account
93
—or if the previous decision was passed per incuriam. The latter means, in the 
context of constitutional review, that a relevant precedent or constitutional rule was not 
even considered by the constitutional court.
94
 It does not suffice if that norm was simply 
misinterpreted; the legal authority has to have been completely ignored. 
 
                                            
90 See, Dec. Hung. CC 75/2008. (V. 29.) AB, ABH 2008, 651, 656 (discussing the issue that there is res iudicata in 
the Court, only if a certain statute has already been examined from the same constitutional aspect. The same 
statute can thus be examined again, if it is challenged on the basis of another constitutional provision.).  
91 Explicit overruling: see, e.g., BVerfGE 85, 264 (285f). Mostly overruling happens in silence, see e.g. Alfonso Ruiz-
Miguel & Francisco J. Laporta, Precedent in Spain, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS. A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 52, 
at 285. A special technique of overruling allowing for legal certainty is the so-called prospective overruling. See 
EISENBERG, supra note 61, at 127–32. This means that although the new rule is applied for the actual case, or not 
even for it, the former one will be applied for all other cases that happened before the decision. Thus, the newly 
declared rule is going to be valid for cases emerging after the decision. Implicit suppression without an explicit 
modification is called transformation, whereas the narrowing of the scope of the previous case is overriding. See 
EISENBERG, supra note 61, at 132–36. “Anticipatory overruling” in the U.S. is when a lower court does not follow 
the precedent by a higher court, because it expects the higher court to overturn its decision anyway. 
92 Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 139 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“The whole function of [stare 
decisis] is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must nevertheless be held to be true.”). 
93 Cf. Practice Statement, (1966) 3 All E.R. 77 (H.L) (discussing the proper development of the law). 
94 On the notion of decisions per incuriam, see Morelle Ltd v. Wakeling, (1955) 1 All E.R. 708, 2 Q.B. 379. 
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Yet, even if one adheres to the precedents (previous choices of interpretation), there is still 
some room for innovative decisions; precedents, like the texts of the norms, only define a 
framework, quite often without providing an unambiguous outcome for the new case. 
Precedents themselves have to be interpreted. This situation was described by Dworkin as 
writing a “chain novel,” each chapter of which is composed by a different author.
95
 One 
always has to keep an eye on how the story has developed so far, and this is what has to 
be continued—i.e., one does not have unlimited freedom—but how the story is going to 
proceed is not completely bound by past decisions. 
 
There may be different reasons for following previous decisions:
96
 (A) Rejecting the 
possibility of an arbitrary innovative decision. If one keeps to his or her previous decision, 
(s)he also thereby shows that in the previous case the decision was made not arbitrarily, 
but on the basis of some legal rule (rule of law). This is not a very convincing argument, 
however, as following a decision does not say anything about the followed decisions. If the 
original decision was a bad one, the reasons to repeat it are rather weak. (B) Satisfying 
expectations to follow precedents. This reason is flawed as it rests on circularity; one ought 
to follow precedents precisely because there is a doctrine of following them. Thus the 
doctrine itself cannot be justified in this way. (C) Efficiency in time or intellectual efforts. It 
is less difficult to repeat, as one does not have to consider all of the potential choices 
again.
97
 The intellectual effort, and the time spent on it, once made, makes it much easier 
next time to retrace the way one decided before than relaying all the steps of thinking. 
Normally this provides a good explanation for the nature of precedents but, alas, this is not 
always the case. In some cases, precedents are not time saving, but rather make the 
decision more cumbersome. E.g., judges can sometimes clearly and quickly see how they 
should decide a new case, but the relevant old precedent they are supposed to follow is a 
mistaken one, thus they make a huge effort to explain why they are not following the old 
precedent. Therefore, the problem with this kind of justification is that it cannot explain 
the huge efforts one sometimes puts into distinguishing. (D) The need for interstitial 
legislation or constitution-making.
98
 According to this reasoning, one considers past 
decisions as binding because this allows for constitutional rules of behavior, the contents 
of which are, on the basis of their text only, uncertain, to become easier to predict in the 
future, and also because the respective constitution-maker may not have the time or may 
not be in the position to go through the cumbersome procedure for making a 
                                            
95 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228–32 (1986). 
96 Following Grant Lamond, Precedent and Analogy in Legal Reasoning, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 3 
(Edward N. Zalta ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-reas-prec/. 
97 See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 597–98 (1987). 
98 Cf. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 194–201 (1979) (arguing that courts ought to have law-making competence 
because there are unforeseen situations). 
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constitutional amendment.
99
 If we want to conceptualize this point not as a justification, 
but rather as an incentive mechanism, then we can say that judges, by following 
precedents, empower themselves to make laws, thus they enhance their own power as a 
social group.
100
 (E) Formal justice—similar cases have to be decided in a similar way for 
reasons of justice.
101
 This argument tacitly presupposes that the right decision was made 
last time—i.e., it is not a mistake that is going to be reiterated—which may, regrettably, 
not be the case.
102
 It cannot be “just” to condemn someone by mistake just because it was 
done to someone else already. 
 
This phenomenon—i.e., following earlier decisions—is also reflected by a notion used by 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court when presided by László Sólyom—that of the invisible 
constitution.
103
 The invisible constitution comprises: (A) A coherent, non-contradictory, 
conceptual system derived from decisions of the constitutional court, (B) the norms 
inferred by such decisions from the text of the constitution, and (C) those norms added to 
the constitution, in such decisions—e.g., the proportionality test—which are beyond the 
text of the constitution. What these have in common is that their content can be 
understood from the decisions of the constitutional court and that they make, after all, a 
possible, and as it is shared by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, a binding, 
interpretation of the constitution. The invisible constitution is essentially the system of the 
court’s decisions; every new decision is another brick in the building of the invisible 
constitution.
104
 
 
Some constitutional courts do not recognize the difference between the binding force of 
the ratio decidendi (the reason underlying the decision—i.e., the part of the reasoning that 
contains the arguments necessary for the given decision; without these the decision would 
not have been made or at least not in that way)
105 
and the obiter dicta (other 
                                            
99 Accord JOHN BELL, POLICY ARGUMENTS IN JUDICIAL DECISIONS 17–20 (1983) (claiming that the judge is in fact an 
interstitial legislator). 
100 See Eric B. Rasmussen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 63–83 (1994) 
101 See MARTIN P. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING 98 (1984), following ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V. 3, 1131a10–b15. 
102 CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note. 63, at 1, 13. 
103 See Dec. Hung CC 23/1990. (X. 31.) AB, ABH 1990, 88, 97-98. 
104 On the dangers—narrowing the room for politics, without democratic legitimacy—and advantages of this 
phenomenon—solving situations where politics came to a standstill, see Christian Starck, Vefassung und Gesetz, 
in, RANGORDNUNG DER GESETZE 29, 32–33 (Christian Starck ed., 1995). 
105 The definition stems from Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161–83 
(1930); Arthur L. Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 M.L.R. 117–24 (1959). For a more subtle discussion, 
see PECZENIK, supra note 79, at 334, who means by “construed ratio decidendi” also the arguments, which may not 
be mentioned in the reasoning, but were implicitly essential for passing a decision. A special difficulty arises in 
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considerations).
106
 The consequence of the lack of this difference is that constitutional 
courts never reject an argument of one of its past decisions for the reason that it was 
merely obiter dictum. 
 
The binding force of precedents is different in every country. In some, there is an 
expectation that an explanation will be provided as to why a former precedent has not 
been followed; in others there is no such requirement. Even if the court’s own precedents 
do not seem to bind strictly the court itself—i.e., the precedent is only of persuasive force, 
only to be considered as a possible solution
107
—it is still possible to differentiate between 
the weight of different precedent arguments. If it is a judgment from a previous 
constitutional regime or if it is the case law of other countries’ courts, then the weight is 
smaller. The latter, comparative law arguments, as there are special problems related to it, 
will be dealt with separately later. 
 
A special case of referring to precedents is when one does not refer to what interpretation 
was adopted by previous decisions, but claims that the interpretation changed gradually 
and therefore, continuing this trend, a decision would have to follow which was never 
passed before. Here, one opts for a certain interpretation because it follows from past 
tendencies of interpretation—e.g., “the court has gradually interpreted this provision more 
and more broadly, so [albeit never interpreted it as broadly as suggested now] one ought 
to interpret it even more broadly than ever before.” This kind of argument would need the 
courts to admit that its own jurisprudence is subject to change, which the constitutional 
courts are rather unwilling to do. For the difference between precedents interpreting 
norms and mere practice without formal decisions, see below at pp. 1262-63. 
 
3. Interpreting the Constitution in the Light of Doctrinal Concepts and Principles 
 
There is another possible argument to the effect that a certain concept found in the text 
means “x,” because this follows from a doctrinal legal concept—e.g., that of an “organ” or 
its being described as such
108
—or a legal principle—e.g., the principle of non-arbitrary use 
                                                                                                                
cases where, because of concurring reasoning and dissenting opinions, there is no reasoning accepted by the 
majority, thus the ratio cannot be established with certainty either. 
106 In Germany the situation is not entirely clear: we find statements that only the ratio decidendi is binding, see 
BVerfGE 1, 14 (37); 19, 377 (392); 20, 56 (87); 40, 88 (93); but we also find judgments which say that the Federal 
Constitutional Court can disregard its own precedents, if the circumstances require it to do so, see BVerfGE 4, 31 
(38); 20, 56 (87); 77, 84 (104). Yet another judgment states that a precedent should be followed not because it is 
a precedent, but because it contains sound reasoning, see BVerfGE 84, 212 (227). This unclear situation is of 
course favourable to the court, as it can pick the doctrine favouring its own moral preferences. 
107 Further on this concept, see Richard Bronaugh, Persuasive Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 217–47 (Laurence 
Goldstein ed., 1987). 
108 We call arguments from a name or description argumentum a notatione. 
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of rights or the principle of nemo plus iuris. If this doctrinal concept or principle is defined 
by referring to another legal rule, then it is a contextual harmonizing argument; if by 
referring to a precedent, then it is a reference to an interpretive precedent. “Interpreting 
the constitution in the light of doctrinal concepts and principles” in the strict sense means 
that neither of the above is used for supporting the content of the given general concept, 
but this content is just accepted as obvious. 
 
Given that a conceptual definition is not usually regarded as binding in itself without a 
background legal rule or decision,
109
 such interpretative references to legal concepts are 
questionable methodologically. A characteristic example of such arguments in Hungary is 
the reference to the separation of powers without linking it to any particular provision of 
the Constitution.
110
 In Spanish case law, the principle of interpreting all statutes in 
conformity with the Constitution is said to be a general (constitutional?) principle.
111
 
 
4. Linguistic-Logical Formulae Based on Silence 
 
Real lawyerly reasoning makes use of not only the text, but also the lack thereof in order to 
interpret the constitution. Characteristic forms of this include principles like expressio 
unius exclusio alterius (expressing the one means excluding the other), qui de uno dicet, de 
altero negat (stating the one means rejecting the other),
112
 argumentum a contrario 
(stating something about “A” may be denying the same about “non-A”),
113
 or enumeratio 
ergo limitatio (an enumeration is presumed to be exhaustive). 
 
A similar way of reasoning is used by the two forms of argumentum a fortiori: Argumentum 
a maiori ad minus and its inverse, argumentum a minori ad maius. The former argument 
holds, e.g., that if the constitution-maker has explicitly allowed something, some other 
action is also allowed—although it is not mentioned explicitly. The latter holds, e.g., that if 
the constitution-maker has explicitly forbidden something, then another, more grave, 
action—although not mentioned explicitly—is also forbidden. Which of the two has to be 
applied can often be decided by way of teleological considerations only.
114
 
                                            
109 In the case of an argument, the lack of binding force means that it may be countered by asking “So what?”. 
Arguments with no binding force show the mere possibility of a solution, the acceptance of which has to be 
supported with arguments having binding force. 
110 See, e.g., Dec. Hung. CC 42/2005. (XI. 14.) AB, ABH 2005, 504, 526, with further references. 
111 Decision of the Spanish constitutional court Nr. 2/81 and 77/83. 
112 See FRANÇOIS OST & MICHEL VAN DE KERCHOVE, ENTRE LA LETTRE ET L’ESPRIT. LES DIRECTIVES D’INTERPRÉTATION EN DROIT 54 
(1989). 
113 See, e.g., László Kiss (dissenting) Dec. Hung. CC 18/1999. (VI. 11.) AB, ABH 1999, 137, 143. Sometimes the a 
contrario argument is referred to as e contrario, meaning the same though. 
114 Cf. SZABÓ, supra note 22, at 208. 
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III. Evaluating Arguments: Arguments from Beyond the Legal Context 
 
These arguments are grouped together because they do not refer to the legal provision 
itself or its legal context, but to its subjective or objective intention or purpose, or even to 
admittedly non-legal—e.g., moral, sociological, or economic—considerations. These 
arguments contain more, or at least more apparent, evaluative elements than the two 
previous groups. 
 
1. Relying on the Objective Purpose of the Norm 
 
This kind of reasoning justifies choosing a certain interpretation by claiming that it 
corresponds to the objective purpose of the norm in question.
115
 The objective purpose 
can be inferred directly from the text—e.g., its title or preamble—or indirectly on the basis 
of it, like the presumable intention of an assumed abstract author.
116
 The purpose itself is 
generally defined as a social purpose (le but social) or ratio legis.
117
 The name of this 
method is objektiv-teleologische Auslegung in German,
118
 purposive interpretation in 
Anglo-American scholarship,
119
 while French-speaking authors call it méthode 
téléologique.
120
 The idea is not a new one, it was also known to the Romans: Scire leges 
non hoc est verba earum tenere, sed vim ac potestatem (knowing the laws does not mean 
knowing their words, but their intent and purpose).
121
  
 
We call this argument the ‘objective teleological’ argument or reference to the ‘objective 
purpose’ of the norm. This denomination does not mean, however, that the objective 
                                            
115 BVerfGE 57, 43 (62ff), 69, 1, 57 (72). For the most thorough explanation of this method, see STEPHEN BREYER, 
ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005). 
116 See AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW xi (2005) (“Intent of any reasonable author.”). 
117 An interesting way of dealing with this problem is the Québec Interpretation Act, providing that “Every 
provision of an Act is deemed to be enacted for the recognition of rights, the imposition of obligations or the 
furtherance of the exercise of rights, or for the remedying of some injustice or the securing of some benefit. Such 
statute shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction as will ensure the attainment of its object and the 
carrying out of its provisions, according to their true intent, meaning and spirit.” Interpretation Act (Québec) sect. 
41. 
118 FRANZ BYDLINSKI, JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE UND RECHTSBEGRIFF 453 (1991). 
119 A special case of this is where the establishment of representative democracy is considered to be the purpose 
of the constitution, and its text is interpreted in this light. This idea leads to judicial self-restraint, since judicial 
review by a constitutional court is a limit to representative democracy. If, however, the purpose is understood to 
be the protection of fundamental rights, then it may justify activism. See MURPHY, supra note 86, at 419–426. 
120 CÔTÉ, supra note 68, at 353, n. 1. 
121 Dig. 1.3.17 (Celsus). 
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purpose can be established in an entirely objective way, the word ‘objective’ simply refers 
to the origin of the purpose: we establish it on the basis of an object, i.e. the norm (and not 
on the basis of a subject, i.e. the law-maker). What this purpose (in Greek: telos) actually is, 
is very much open to the partly subjective interpretations of scholars and judges. 
 
In German works, such arguments are sometimes found under the heading Natur der 
Sache (it follows from the nature of the thing).
122
 Also the principle Antwortcharakter der 
Verfassung (the response character of the constitution), widespread in Austrian 
jurisprudence, should be mentioned here.
123
 Two particular cases of the argument are the 
EU law principle effet utile and the implied powers doctrine of international law, which rest 
on the assumption that the supposed constitution-maker would certainly have preferred a 
special interpretation, even if not mentioned explicitly, for a want of the norms to be 
effective, and therefore—e.g., competences for implementation have to be interpreted 
broadly. Also the common law principle magis est ut res valeat quam pereat (that the thing 
may rather have effect than be destroyed—i.e., legal provisions have to be given a 
meaning which enables them to be effective) follows this way of reasoning.
124
  
 
There are principles of interpretation that do not seem to have an objective teleological 
character at first sight, but still rest on such assumptions. For example, the Austrian idea of 
intrasystematische Fortentwicklung (development within the limits of the system, 
according to which rules of competence can be understood in a broader sense than that 
according to the original Versteinerungstheorie (see above), and particularly in the case of 
new technologies—e.g., “telegraph” also means “video phone,” as the latter did not exist 
at that time)
125
 and the Canadian doctrine of living tree (i.e., the interpretation of the text 
has to be adapted to changes rather than limited to a static “original meaning,” since the 
constitution is like a living tree, accommodating itself to the circumstances dynamically and 
gradually).
126
 These presuppose that there is some inherent purpose of the text beyond 
what is written in it, and that this purpose can be followed even against the text. 
                                            
122 See RAISCH, supra note 75, at 176–78. 
123 This is a historical argument, where one refers not to what a norm says but what it does not (eloquent silence). 
This is to mean that the norm is actually silent on an issue, which seems doubtful, because it was beyond any 
question at the time of enacting. E.g. the B-VG does not prescribe whether the cabinet decides unanimously or by 
majority vote, but since this (viz. unanimous decision) was evident at the time art. 69 B-VG was enacted, one has 
to assume that this is implied by the B-VG even today, or else the constitution-makers would have amended it 
explicitly. Silence means that the purpose of the norm is to stick to the old, then obvious, solution. See Bernhard 
Raschauer, Art. 69, in ÖSTERREICHISCHES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSRECHT margin n. 28 (Karl Korinek & Michael Holoubek 
eds., loose-leaf ed., 2003). 
124 See Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Momodou Jobe, (1984) A.C. 689, 702 (Lord Diplock). 
125 VfSlg 2720/1954. 
126 Peter W. Hogg, Canada: From Privy Council to Supreme Court, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY, supra note 66, at 55, 85–87. The same idea has made a career in the U.S. under the name living 
constitution, see, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976). 
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In some countries the objective teleological interpretation is strongly favored—e.g., 
Germany—in others like in Austria or especially in Hungary, it is traditionally much weaker 
but is becoming stronger exactly due to German, and ECHR, influence. The weakness in 
Hungary can be traced back to socialism, which tried to minimize judicial creativity, as 
creativity seemed dangerous in the dictatorship because of its uncontrolled nature.
127
 The 
Austrian anti-teleological feature is partly due to traditional, 19th century, Austrian 
positivism; partly it is a legacy of Hans Kelsen.
128
 
 
1.1 Excursus on a Special Type of Objective Teleological Interpretation: Dworkin 
 
Ronald Dworkin put forth a special kind of teleological interpretation internationally 
popular among constitutional lawyers. According to his view, every case has only one right 
solution (one right answer thesis), which has to be found by the judge applying the law by 
way of constructive (creative) interpretation.
129
 This means that the right answer gives the 
best possible interpretation of the legal rule in question; the best interpretation, in turn, 
should be understood as the interpretation most compatible with the political morality of 
the given community—the result of the interpretation obtained in this way may be very 
remote from the result of a plain grammatical interpretation. Performing interpretation 
this way is a particularly difficult task, which demands almost superhuman skills. Dworkin 
calls the ideal person having these superhuman skills of a judge Hercules.
130
 This view 
implies that every legal provision has the objective purpose—i.e., the actual intention of 
the constitution-maker may not be relevant—of supporting the moral principles of the 
given political community and contributing to their effectiveness. The judge has to 
presume that there is one single coherent moral view behind the legal system as a whole 
which fits to the social practices based on law, including the legal rules, and at the same 
time justifies that very legal order (law as integrity).
131
 From the possible moral views 
behind the legal order, which “fit” to the legal order, the one with the strongest moral 
“appeal” should be selected.  
 
The most important problem with this kind of theory is that it substitutes the legal debate, 
at least partially, with a debate on the political morality of the community, for which there 
are a lot less rules of discussion—i.e., constitutional lawyers are trained to follow rules of 
                                            
127 For more detail and further references, see András Jakab, Surviving Socialist Legal Concepts and Methods, in 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE HUNGARIAN LEGAL ORDER 1985-2005 606, 606–619 (András Jakab et al. eds., 2007). 
128 András Jakab, Two Opposing Paradigms of Continental European Constitutional Thinking: Austria and Germany, 
INT’L & COMP. L.Q., 933, 933-55, (2009) (with further references). 
129 DWORKIN, supra note 95, at viii–ix. 
130 Id. at 239. 
131 Id. at 225–28, 254–58. 
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legal methodology, but none of us are trained to follow the “rules of political philosophy 
debates” as there are just no such rules—and on which it is much more difficult to make 
compromises.
132
 The less technical we become, the more emotional the debate will be. 
Therefore, if possible, one should argue with reference to the specific purposes of specific 
rules rather than the overall purpose of the legal system as a whole. Unfortunately, this 
purpose-narrowing is not always possible, as our ideas about the specific purposes of 
specific provisions may depend on our general views of political philosophy.
133
 But at least, 
direct reference to such considerations should be minimized in constitutional 
interpretation as far as possible. Otherwise we lose one of the main reasons for having 
constitutional reasoning: Taming ideological and political conflicts by transforming them 
into technical-legal issues. Referring to general purposes, or general moral reasons 
underlying the legal system, is further complicated by the fact that if one does not want to 
give a long list of commonplaces, but rather something that may be relevant in deciding an 
actual legal case, then a range of competing narratives can be offered as the moral sense 
behind the legal system.
134
 Sometimes this may be true for finding the telos behind the 
particular legal rules as well, but there one has at least slightly more of a chance of not 
delving into fundamental questions, so the debate is less vehement, the minority accepting 
the outcome more easily.
135
 In a pluralist democratic system, such as we have in Europe, 
different narratives on the political and moral nature of the legal system ought to be 
considered as normal, so a general “moral base” of the legal system, except for a minimal 
notion of pragmatic common self-interest, does not exist. To rely on the general moral 
base of the legal system usually just masks our own moral preferences as legal necessities. 
True, one’s moral preferences cannot be completely eliminated from legal reasoning, yet 
                                            
132 Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1637-1715 (1998) 
(Especially at 1695, this presents Dworkin as ‘the Taliban of Western legal thought’). 
133 BURTON, supra note 60, at 101–23. 
134 It is for this reason that the theory stemming from Rudolf Smend, according to which the constitution as a 
whole aims for “integration,” has to be rejected. Integration in the Smendian sense in pluralist societies is verging 
on the impossible. Smend, and the reception of Schmitt, are heavily criticized as the projection of a conservative 
state-centred (etatist) morality by ROBERT CHR. VAN OOYEN, DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN DES 
BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS (2005). For a fitting argument possibly scaring away liberals in some European 
countries from Dworkin, see also the opinion of an Irish judge: “The political philosophy of our Constitution owes 
infinitely more to Thomas Aquinas than Thomas Paine” in High Court of Ireland [H. Ct. - Federal Court], Director of 
Public Prosecutions v. Best, (2000), 2 I.R. 17, 65. Dworkin would probably answer to this that his theory is 
geographically not universal—i.e., it has been developed solely for the U.S. or at the most for democracies of a 
similar liberal approach, cf. DWORKIN, supra note 95, at 102–03—but if he does so, then it would be simpler, more 
open and more honest just to leave aside the “fit” part of his argument as what he does is interpreting 
constitutional law in the light of his own, liberal, moral preferences. With the anti-universal approach, he basically 
filters out those cases where there could be a contradiction between “fit” and “appeal,” and he seems to filter 
the possible legal orders, thus the “fit”-side, based on his political philosophy—i.e., based on his “appeal” 
preferences. 
135 For a similar criticism on Dworkin, see NIGEL E. SIMMONDS, CENTRAL ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE. JUSTICE, LAW AND RIGHTS 
217 (2002). 
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their role ought to be severely limited for reasons of legitimacy in a pluralist society. 
Dworkin’s theory of interpretation does not replace legal reasoning with a moral one, but 
it does strengthen considerably the role of moral arguments, encouraging the interpreter 
to use them more overtly. In light of the above considerations, his view is thus open to 
serious objections.
136
 
 
We of course all have a more or less coherent, sometimes just unconscious, political 
philosophy which can help us make choices of constitutional interpretation; however, it is 
quite a different thing to have such a general theory in the back of our mind and to refer to 
it in debates on constitutional reasoning. The latter is alien from the genre and due to its 
emotional nature likely to waste the taming nature of constitutional reasoning. 
Constitutional reasoning can fulfill its function of justifying decisions in its specific way 
exactly because certain touchy issues remain unspoken. 
 
1.2 Objections to Objective Teleological Arguments and How to Respond to Them 
 
The most frequent objections are (A) that the same text can have several purposes, which 
may lead to interpretations contradicting each other, and therefore an unclear choice 
among them, and (B) that even a clear ratio legis sometimes fails to show which 
interpretation could support it best as to its consequences—e.g., because this would need 
an empirical survey, which the interpreter cannot carry out.
137
 These objections are 
relevant, but they do not mean that, in general, we cannot successfully use teleological 
arguments, only that these do not always bring about a suitable result. 
 
It may also be argued that the text has no intention; only persons have intentions. Indeed, 
texts do not have intentions, but just as one can say that the function/purpose of a 
hammer is to drive in nails, rather than to sweep, also the provisions of the constitution 
may have functions/purposes attributed to them. 
 
An argument against a particular form of objective teleological arguments—i.e., referring 
to the intention of an assumed abstract constitution-maker rather than the purpose of the 
text—may be that there are no “abstract authors,” only actual ones. This is true, and 
therefore it is preferable to refer to the purpose of the text than to the intention of an 
abstract author. 
 
                                            
136 Similarly problematic is JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1981) who suggests 
that the (U.S.) Constitution should always be interpreted in a way that reinforces the nation’s system of 
democratic representation. The supposition of such overarching purposes behind the Constitution leads to never 
ending political philosophical debates. 
137 PECZENIK, supra note 79, at 412, 414–15. 
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2. Relying on the Intention of the Constitution-Maker (Subjective Teleological Arguments) 
 
Unlike in the previous section, here we deal with arguments referring not to the, more or 
less concrete, objective purpose of a particular provision of the constitution or the legal 
system as a whole, but to the actual purpose or intention of the constitution-maker.
138
 One 
refers to this not because one thinks that the constitution-maker “knows better than 
anyone else how to interpret the provision[, b]ut simply because this is her 
interpretation.”
139
 The reason for this is that normally the constitution-maker has stronger 
legitimacy, being closer to the source of sovereignty, than those interpreting or applying it. 
A means of investigating the constitution-maker’s intention may be consulting the travaux 
préparatoires of the constitution-making process.
140
 
 
References to the subjective purpose can be divided into two groups, according to their 
content. (A) The first type raises the question what the constitution-maker intended at the 
particular historical moment.
141
 In contemporary American literature on constitutional law 
this is called original intent. In the French literature such arguments were traditionally put 
forth by adherents of the so-called “exegetic school” (École de l’Exégèse),
142
 but since 
Blackstone the method has been well-known in England.
143
 (B) The other group of 
references to the subjective purpose concentrates on the question of what the 
constitution-maker would say today, among the altered historical circumstances. French 
authors call this méthode évolutive.
144
 
 
The most plausible objection, in addition to the objection of fiction mentioned above, to 
the arguments of group (A) was formulated by Thomas Jefferson: 
 
                                            
138 This may be difficult to prove—particularly in the case of a group decision where some may not be aware of 
what they vote for; or different persons may have different purposes—therefore some consider this concept as 
fiction. See CÔTÉ, supra note 68, at 13–14. The same problems arise to an even greater extent if one refers to the 
will of the “people” in the case of a statute, see, e.g., EKKEHART STEIN & GÖTZ FRANK, STAATSRECHT 34 (2002). One may 
refer to the intent of the drafter(s) instead, see, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment 
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 17 (1971). This, however, raises problems in terms of legitimacy, since it is not the drafters 
but the constitution-maker that makes the constitution. 
139 JÁNOS KIS, ALKOTMÁNYOS DEMOKRÁCIA 134 (2000). 
140 A Hungarian example is Dec. Hung. CC 4/1997. (I. 22.) AB, ABH 1997, 41, 45-46. 
141 E.g. BVerfGE 88, 40 (56f.); 102, 176 (185). 
142 PIERRE PESCATORE, INTRODUCTION À LA SCIENCE DU DROIT 333–35 (1960). 
143 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 59 (8th ed. 1765) (“The fairest and most rational 
method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made.”). 
144 Cf. PESCATORE, supra note 142, at 331 (discussing statutory interpretation in general). 
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Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious 
reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, 
too sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of 
the preceding age a wisdom more than human . . . I 
knew that age well . . . It was very like the present, but 
without the experience of the present . . . Let us follow 
no such examples, nor weakly believe that one 
generation is not as capable as another of taking care 
of itself, and of ordering its own affairs.
 145
 
 
Moreover, the constitution-maker’s intention may be manifold and in particular cases 
these may lead to interpretations contradicting one another.
146
 The constitution-maker 
may even have intended to leave a question open. The most important problem 
concerning arguments of type (B) is that they are rather hypothetic and unverifiable—i.e., 
“in such a case the constitution-maker would say that.” A reference to the point of view of 
those to whom the norm is addressed is a serious argument against both types: 
 
[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic 
government—or indeed, even with fair government—
to have the meaning of a law determined by what the 
lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver 
promulgated. It was said of the tyrant Nero that he 
used to have his edicts posted high up on the pillars, so 
that they would be more difficult to read, thus 
entrapping some into inadvertent violation. A legal 
system that determines the meaning of laws on the 
basis of what was meant rather than what was said is 
similarly tyrannical.
 147
 
 
In the jurisprudence of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the most relevant objections to 
subjective teleological arguments were formulated by László Kiss: 
 
Moreover, the concept of “the legislator’s intent”—
which the majority decision too makes use of—is a 
rather contradictory one both in terms of the 
constitution and the interpretation of law. Possible 
                                            
145 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in THE PORTABLE JEFFERSON 558–59 (Merrill D. 
Peterson ed., 1975). 
146 Brison & Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 63, at 11. 
147 Antonin Scalia, supra note 92, at 17. 
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objections are of two kinds. First, one has to answer 
the question of whether the “uniform” intent of a 
collective body (the assembly comprising 386 
representatives) can be traced back at all? (A possible 
message of accepting the reference to the intent is that 
in cases allowing for deliberation those applying the 
law may identify the assumed intent of the legislator 
with their own intent, which may not be free from all 
arbitrariness.) . . . In defining the intent, can one 
construct a ranking to the effect that what was said by 
the person introducing the bill—who, being a minister, 
is not even necessarily one of the representatives—is 
more important than the votes of the representatives 
saying “yes” or “no”? Even if one cannot exclude the 
theoretical possibility of several hundreds of people 
having the same intent in a given moment: are the 
Official Protocols of the National Assembly a sufficient 
evidence of this? [On the problem of the legislator’s 
intent see e.g. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 
Harvard Law Review 863, 870–871; Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harvard 
Law Review 417, 417–419 (“We do not enquire what 
the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute 
means.”).] 
 
Another, even stronger objections may be found on the 
second level of objections, which I call “normative.” If 
there exists empirically “the legislator’s intent,” can 
one argue that it has any power? The legislator speaks 
through the written text, not her assumed intention. In 
a constitutional state observing the rule of law it is the 
rule of law that has to be effective, not the intentions 
of the actual legislators (“government of laws, not 
men”). The Constitutional Court, in turn, is bound by 
the text of the Constitution only, it cannot consider the 
assumed intent of those drafting the Constitution (in 
the case of constitutional interpretation), or that of the 
legislature (when declaring the norm in question 
contrary to the constitution) when seeking to find firm 
ground for the legitimacy of a decision. This argument 
resembles the concurring reasoning of László Sólyom to 
the decision 23/1990. (X. 31.) AB, where he opposed 
the freedom of the legislature, by virtue of which the 
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National Assembly can decide following any reason, 
scientific, political, or practical, to that of the 
Constitutional Court, which can pass decisions founded 
upon arguments of constitutional law only, and is 
therefore not even bound by the legislator’s intent. 
(ABH 1990, 88, 97.) In a constitutional state observing 
the rule of law, one cannot expect those bound by law 
to use a concept, which is obscure and has no binding 
force, as the compass of their lawful/unlawful 
behavior.
 148
 
 
In order to eliminate the above problems, it may be helpful to (A) reformulate, if possible, 
the subjective teleological arguments into objective teleological arguments—i.e., one 
should speak of the ratio of the constitutional provision rather than some purpose of the 
constitution-maker—and (B) to trace this back to the text itself rather than to travaux 
préparatoires or other documents of a non-legal kind. 
 
Alongside the positive type of subjective teleological arguments—i.e., what the 
constitution-maker intended—these arguments also appear in negative forms—i.e., what 
the constitution-maker could not have intended. Typical examples of these are cases 
where a certain interpretation is accepted with the rationale that the constitution-maker 
“might not want to contradict herself,” “might not want to infringe international law,” 
“might not want to codify meaningless or irrational rules,” or “might not want to proceed 
in an unfair way.” These arguments too, just as the positive subjective teleological 
arguments mentioned above, all rest on the assumption of rationality on the part of the 
constitution-maker,
149
 and may justify, e.g., the interpretation of misspelled texts, without 
any official correction, so that they become meaningful. Also the English Golden Rule, or as 
it is called in the U.S., the soft plain meaning rule—i.e., the grammatical interpretation is 
basically accepted, yet one may depart from it if it leads to an absurd result, since this 
cannot be what the constitution-maker wanted
150
—is based on this logic; in continental 
European terminology we would say that the grammatical interpretation has been 
corrected by an argumentum ad absurdum.
151
 There are no general methodological 
objections to these negative subjective teleological arguments. Still, negative subjective 
                                            
148 In one of his dissenting opinions, Dec. Hung. CC 675/B/2001, ABH 2002, 1320, 1344-1345. 
149 For a more detailed discussion of these arguments, see François Ost, L’interprétation logique et systématique 
et le postulat de rationalité du législateur, in L’INTERPRÉTATION EN DROIT: APPROCHE PLURIDISCIPLINAIRE 97, 159–77 
(Michel van de Kerchove ed., 1978). 
150 Cf. JAMES HOLLAND & JULIAN WEBB, LEARNING LEGAL RULES 234–36 (2006) (discussing statutory interpretation in 
general). 
151 See SZABÓ, supra note 22, at 210 (discussing the argumentum ad absurdum). 
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teleological arguments are sometimes so abstract—i.e., not linked to the actual 
constitution-maker—that they seem to be, in fact, objective teleological arguments. 
 
3. Substantive (Non-Legal: Moral, Sociological, Economic) Arguments 
 
Arguments of a substantive, or prudential, character are seldom used in most European 
constitutional courts. Examples can be found in cases where no other arguments can help, 
or other arguments lead to interpretations contradicting one another and one has to 
choose. Such arguments may also appear in cases involving rather abstract general clauses 
or abstract and value-laden legal provisions. In an Anglo-Saxon context, such arguments 
are linked to the Law and Economics movement,
152
 also the so-called Brandeis Briefs
153
 
may be considered the manifestation of this kind of arguments; in French-speaking 
cultures, following François Gény, to the slogan Libre Recherche Scientifique; while in 
German-speaking jurisprudence to the Freirechtsschule.
154
 Adherents of substantive 
arguments are split on whether you can use both economic-sociological
155
 and moral 
arguments
156
 or just one of them.
157
 Using moral arguments has to be distinguished from 
the Dworkinian theory of interpretation discussed above, which does not refer to moral 
arguments as such, but to moral arguments which can be found within the legal order in 
force and which serve to justify that very legal order. Thus, the Dworkinian reason for a 
particular interpretation cannot be that the meaning of a constitutional provision is a 
“moral” one, but that the given interpretation fits best to the best reading of the principles 
                                            
152 See William N. Eskridge, Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory 
Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988) (discussing its impact on legal interpretation). For a consequence-based 
theory of interpretation under the heading “pragmatism,” see Richard A. Posner, Interpretation Revisited, in 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 63, at 102–17. 
153 Louis Brandeis, Justice of the Supreme Court between 1916 and 1939, argued as an attorney in the case Muller 
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) by delivering a detailed sociological presentation of the social effects of long 
working hours on women. 
154 On these German and French schools, see JEAN-LOUIS BERGEL, MÉTHODOLOGIE JURIDIQUE 249–53 (2001); JEAN-
CASSIEN BILLIER & AGLAÉ MARYOLI, HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 189–94 (2001). 
155 See Richard A. Posner, The Costs of Enforcing Legal Rights, 3 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 71 (1995) (discussing the “right” 
interpretation of fundamental rights based on a cost-benefit analysis, with examples from U.S. constitutional 
interpretation). For a critique of Posner on moral grounds, see Kis János, From Costs and Benefits to Fairness: 
Comments on Richard Posner, 3 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 84 (1995). 
156 E.g. BVerfGE 84, 212 (221). Within moral arguments one may further distinguish between references to critical 
morality (“the” right approach of morality) and references to the moral views of the majority of the society (social 
morality), see, e.g., Rainer Arnold, Réflexions sur l’argumentation juridique en droit constitutionnel allemande, in 
RAISONNEMENT JURIDIQUE ET INTERPRÉTATION, supra note 10, at 61. The latter emerges very rarely in Hungarian 
constitutional case law: 154/2008. (XII. 17.) AB, ABH 2008, 1203, 1235. 
157 For a combined example, see Dec. Hung. CC 23/1990. (X. 31.) AB, ABH 1990, 88, 93, with references to values 
on the one hand, and the lack of effectiveness, on the other. 
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morally justifying the legal order. Here, however, one finds a reference less subtle and 
more direct than that of Dworkin. 
 
In Germany, these arguments arise under the heading Wertordnung der Verfassung. An 
even more direct form of the moral argument is to refer to natural law.
158
 In Hungary, 
however, this concept was explicitly rejected by the constitutional court with reference to 
legal certainty.
159
 The then president of the court termed this approach as constitutional 
positivism (Verfassungspositivismus).
160
 
 
Constitutional positivism is indeed a plausible approach, as almost any argument can be 
“translated” into objective teleological arguments, thus giving them a legal form. Once 
introduced, legal arguments are exposed to criticism through other legal arguments, which 
opens the way for a rational legal discourse.
161
 
 
IV. Further Arguments 
 
The last group of methods is unified by the mere fact that these can serve merely as 
sources of inspiration or a toolkit of ideas, i.e., they can only show the theoretical 
possibility of a certain interpretation or give a persuasive authority, without being a 
binding reason for choosing that very interpretation. 
 
 
 
1. Referring to Scholarly Works 
 
A certain interpretation can be supported by the fact that it appears in scholarly literature, 
preferably in the works of a jurist of high reputation (argumentum ab auctoritate), or as 
                                            
158 See the commentary to the decision BVerfGE 95, 96 in VERFASSUNGSRECHTSSPRECHUNG 605–611 (Jörg Menzel ed., 
2000). On German references to natural law, see BVerfGE 3, 88; 6, 132; 23, 98. On the arguments for and against 
the references to values in the jurisprudence of the German constitutional court, see Ernst-Wolfgang 
Böckenförde, Zur Kritik der Wertbegründung des Rechts, in RECHTSPOSITIVISMUS UND WERTBEZUG DES RECHTS 33, 45 
(Ralf Dreier ed., 1990); Christian Starck, Zur Notwendigkeit der Wertbegründung des Rechts, in id. at 59–61. 
159 Dec. Hung. CC 11/1992. (III. 5.) AB, ABH 1992, 77, 82, 84–85. Unlike e.g. the USA, where such arguments do 
play a major role, see Mark Tushnet, supra note 66, at 38-40. 
160 LÁSZLÓ SÓLYOM, AUFBAU UND DOGMATISCHE FUNDIERUNG DER UNGARISCHEN VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT, OSTEUROPA-
RECHT 235 (2000). 
161 Further objections to moral arguments: (1) Giving them a legal form (i.e. forbidding direct references to 
morality) serves the taming and easing of ideological oppositions, see ERNST FORSTHOFF, ZUR PROBLEMATIK DER 
VERFASSUNGSAUSLEGUNG 22–25 (1961); (2) References to morality are not representative of the whole of society, as 
they reflect the morality of (upper middle-class) lawyers and are therefore anti-democratic, see ELY, supra note 
136, at 59. 
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the commonly accepted view (herrschende Meinung). In some legal cultures it has a heavy 
persuasive weight (e.g. Germany where as a consequence of the prestige of legal 
scholarship, constitutional law professors are often appointed as judges at the Federal 
Constitutional Court), in others the situation is rather the opposite (U.K.).
162
 In the U.S., 
reference to academic writing mostly serves only to point to factual information, or to 
decorate the conclusion already defended by other interpretive techniques.
163
 
 
2. Arguments from Comparative Law 
 
Last but not least, arguments from comparative law have to be mentioned.
164
 It is 
interesting to note that Section 35.1 of the South African Interim Constitution,
165
 as well as 
Section 39.1 of the now valid Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
166
 explicitly 
encourage the study of foreign cases in constitutional review.
167
 Like scholarly works, such 
arguments have no binding force,
168
 yet they may help to give the impression that a 
decision was arrived at after careful consideration. 
 
Reasoning with arguments of comparative law in constitutional interpretation is a global 
phenomenon or trend.
169
 One may or may not like this trend,
170
 but its existence is beyond 
                                            
162 For a discussion on the historical reasons of the differences in use of legal scholarship, see András Jakab, Seven 
Role Models of Legal Scholars, 2 GERMAN L.J. 757 (2011). For an example of deference of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court to academic critique, see BVerfGE 84, 212 (227). 
163 Tushnet, supra note 66, at 44 n. 109. 
164 E.g., BVerfGE 84, 239 (269); 89, 155 (189); 95, 408 (423f.). Peter Häberle, Grundrechtsgeltung und 
Grundrechtsinterpretation im Verfassungsstaat – Zugleich zur Rechtsvergleichung als “fünfter” 
Auslegungsmethode, 44 JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 913 (1989) (mentioning comparative law as the fifth method of 
interpretation in addition to the traditional four (grammatical, logical, systematic and historical) of Savigny). 
165 S. AFR. (INTERIM) CONST., 1993 (“In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the 
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and shall, where 
applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this 
Chapter, and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.”). 
166 S. AFR. CONST., 1996. (“When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) must promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must 
consider international law; and (c) may consider foreign law.”). 
167 For a discussion on this topic, see D. M. Davis, Constitutional Borrowing: The Influence of Legal Culture and 
Local History in the Reconstruction of Comparative Influence: The South African Experience, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 181, 
189–91 (2003). 
168 This is called ‘soft use’ by Taavi Annus, Comparative Constitutional Reasoning: The Law and Strategy of 
Selecting the Right Argument, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 301 (2004). According to an even more radical 
description, such references have a merely ‘ornamental function.’ See Ulrich Drobnig, The Use of Comparative 
Law by Courts, in THE USE OF COMPARATIVE LAW BY COURTS 3, 18. (Ulrich Drobnig & Sjef van Erp eds., 1999). 
169 Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights? Transnational Judicial Conversation on 
Constitutional Rights, 20 O.J.L.S. 499, 506 (2000). 
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doubt.
171
 The main causes of the trend are: The general trend of globalization, and, as a 
consequence, the overall weakening of national isolation; the emergence of inter- or 
supranational courts
172
 as meeting points of different legal cultures, where the practice of 
legal comparison spreads the culture of comparative law even beyond its own institutional 
limits;
173
 and the similar role-perception of judges (i.e. that of guarding the basic values of 
constitutionalism which are considered as being some kind of modern or postmodern 
natural law or as a modern ius gentium)
174
 in liberal democracies. This common identity 
then serves as the ground for a feeling of global community, which in turn leads to a 
dialogue,
175
 which manifests itself in references made in decisions to each other’s works.
176
 
Beyond these reasons for the use of comparative law arguments, the explicit reference to 
foreign case law might be especially relevant for new constitutional courts of transitional 
countries which try to show themselves in a prestigious society of well-established foreign 
constitutional, or supreme courts in order to collect more credibility in their respective 
domestic discourses. And finally, considering a foreign interpretation might be helpful even 
if, for some reason, we eventually reject that specific interpretation: It can still be used for 
purposes of contrast, by showing what we do not want to adopt. In this negative way, it 
can help us to understand and to crystallize the reasons behind our own interpretation 
better, for others and for ourselves too. 
 
                                                                                                                
170 Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997); Donald P. Kommers, 
Comparative Constitutional Law: Its Increasing Relevance, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
61 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002); Lorraine E. Weinrib, Constitutional Conceptions and 
Constitutional Comparativism, in id. at 3. 
171 This is characteristic not only of small countries, but may also be observed e.g. in the U.S., see, e.g., Cheryl 
Saunders, The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 39 (2006). An 
interesting figure is that 60% of the cases referred to by Québécois courts are of foreign law (e.g. French or 
common law). See H. Patrick Glenn, Persuasive Authority, 32 MCGILL L.J. 261, 294 (1987). 
172 In the context of the ECJ, see T. Koopmans, Comparative Law and the Courts, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 545, 546 
(1996). 
173 For a discussion on the clarification of vague principles through comparison in international law, see SIGRID 
JACOBY, ALLGEMEINE RECHTSGRUNDSÄTZE: BEGRIFFSENTWICKLUNG UND FUNKTION IN DER EUROPÄISCHEN RECHTSGESCHICHTE 184–
90 (1997). From EU law, Sigrid Jacoby discusses the example of Art. 288. 2 [ex Art. 215.2] of the EC Treaty, id. at 
210–15. 
174 See Gábor Halmai, The Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1331–32 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). 
175 For a discussion on the dialogue model of this phenomenon, see Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of 
Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 855–65 (1999); 
SHAPING RULE OF LAW THROUGH DIALOGUE: INTERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL EXPERIENCES (Filippo Fontanelli et al. eds., 
2010). 
176 For a discussion on this phenomenon as part of the international communication between courts, see Anne-
Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 99, 129–32 (1994). 
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Arguments against this approach form three groups: Objections (A) based on legitimacy;
177
 
or (B) on methodology;
178
 and (C) criticizing the mindless borrowing of foreign ideas.
179
 The 
first objection can be dealt with by clarifying that the argument from comparative law is 
not a conclusive one (i.e. only an idea for further consideration). As for the second 
objection, the comparison ought to be as broad as possible and the arguments considered 
as sources of inspiration, not necessarily as solutions, given the difference of contexts. The 
usual trick of choosing only those countries that apply the same solutions as we prefer, 
should thus be avoided. These two answers also give a response to the third objection: by 
considering comparative law only as an idea, and by bearing in mind the contextuality of 
constitutional solutions, we make it clear that we have to think through the particular 
foreign solutions and find out whether they can be applied to us or not. 
 
The most important argument for the comparative method is the common-sense principle 
of “two heads are better than one,” or “wise men learn by other men’s mistakes.”
180
 Such 
theoretical arguments, however, are usually only of secondary importance for undertaking 
or not undertaking legal comparison: Whether one goes for an international overview, or 
not, basically depends on whether one has sufficient time and knowledge of the relevant 
languages. 
 
V. The Relationship Between the Methods 
 
In our survey we discussed four major types of arguments: (A) Linguistic, grammatical, or 
textualist, methods; (B) systemic arguments; (C) evaluative arguments; and (D) arguments 
from scholarship and comparative law, which only have persuasive force. When inquiring 
about the relationship between them, we have to make general theoretical statements 
                                            
177 The defense of authentic national identity against the new imperialism, see Carlos F Rosenkrantz, Against 
Borrowings and Other Nonauthoratitative Uses of Foreign Law, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 269 (2003). General concerns of 
legitimacy, see Antonin Scalia, Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 305 (2004). 
178 The choice of foreign material is not only arbitrary (or, more properly, one looks for support for an already 
given conclusion) and uncontrollable, it is also dangerous for stability, delivering arguments for departing from 
the already established case law, see Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law, 26 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 411 (1985); George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 683 
(1998). Borrowing is always problematic because of the different cultural and political contexts, see Wiktor 
Osiatynski, Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 244 (2003); Richard Posner, No Thanks, We 
Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Aug. 2004, at 41, 41–42. Every country has a different argumentative 
culture, so legal reasoning cannot be borrowed, see PIERRE LEGRAND, LE DROIT COMPARÉ 81–99 (1999). The tacit 
presupposition that constitutional laws converge, is not true, see Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutionalism in a 
Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2570, 2584 (2004). 
179 Christian Walter, Dezentrale Konstitutionalisierung durch nationale und internationale Gerichte: Überlegungen 
zur Rechtsvergleichung als Methode im öffentlichen Recht, in NICHT-NORMATIVE STEUERUNG IN DEZENTRALEN SYSTEMEN 
205, 224 (Janbernd Oebbecke ed., 2005). 
180 Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1307 (1999). 
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knowing that constitutional courts in practice sometimes do not follow any theoretical 
pattern in weighing the arguments, or they sometimes give lip service to old and outdated 
theories of interpretation (e.g. that of Montesquieu’s famous saying that judges are simply 
“mouthpieces of the law”). Thus any description of the weighing of methods of 
interpretation necessarily becomes also a prescription. The following passages are to be 
read in the light of this disclaimer. 
 
When interpreting constitutions, the first step is usually the examination of the arguments 
of the type (A), even without explicitly mentioning them, just as an implied starting point. 
This is followed by the use of more or less subtle, according to the country specific 
sophistication of Verfassungsdogmatik, systemic arguments. Arguments of the types (A) 
and (B) are basically accepted everywhere as general lawyerly methods, though with 
different weight. Evaluative arguments of type (C) or rather their explicit use, are, 
however, deliberately rejected or limited by some constitutional cultures, mostly due to 
their arbitrariness.
181
 Arguments of type (D), which lack binding power in European 
constitutional cultures, are used occasionally and as their inventory is almost infinite, and 
are deployed primarily depending on the time and/or the languages one knows. 
 
Choices between different arguments or types of arguments are often determined by the 
concerns of legitimacy mentioned above.
182
 Arguments of type (A) pose the least problem 
from this aspect, and those of type (C) are the most problematic. Those of type (D) do not 
count in this regard, as they admittedly serve only as sources of inspiration with no binding 
force. This situation has led to the formulation of principles like interpretatio cessat in 
claris,
183
 quand la loi est claire, il faut la suivre (if the statute is clear, it has to be observed), 
or l’esprit l’emporte sur la lettre (the spirit [of a statute] is expressed by its letter).
184
 It is 
hard, however, to keep to these less legitimacy-demanding methods, if the interpretation 
thus obtained would remain too obscure, or too vague, or even absurd.
185
 In such cases, 
one cannot help but move on towards more legitimacy-demanding grounds: Quand elle est 
                                            
181 The attitude towards the creative arguments of type (C) also depends on which institutions one trusts. If one 
thinks that the legislature is short-sighted, populist, and incompetent, then constitutional courts are likely to 
prefer creative, interpretatory techniques, while if the prestige of judges is low (because they are considered to 
be anti-democratic, elitist, corrupt, or maybe adherents of the ancien régime), then one opts for a text-based 
interpretation. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 169 (1996). 
182 There are also tacit political philosophies, (conceptions of democracy) underlying the preferences in terms of 
methods of legal interpretation, but we shall not discuss these here. For a detailed analysis, see MARTIN KRIELE, 
THEORIE DER RECHTSGEWINNUNG ENTWICKELT AM PROBLEM DER VERFASSUNGSINTERPRETATION 27-31 (1976). 
183 It is described as an argument used in Belgian jurisprudence, see François Ost & Michel van de Kerchove, Les 
directives d’interprétation en théorie du droit et en droit positif belge. La lettre et l’esprit, in LES RÈGLES 
D’INTERPRÉTATION 25, 25–27 (Jean-François Perrin ed., 1989). 
184 It is formulated (also) somewhat differently, see CÔTÉ, supra note 68, at 265–285. 
185 Cf. the British Golden Rule, see supra p. 206. 
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obscure, il faut en approfondir les dispositions (if [the statute] is obscure, its provisions 
have to be examined more closely).
186
 
 
Methods of type (A) provide, firstly, a field which is certainly within the scope of the 
expression interpreted, a black core, secondly, one which is definitely outside of it, a white 
environment, and thirdly, a blurred grey penumbra.
187
 Through the methods of type (B), 
(C), and (D), the cases in the grey penumbra will then be classified as either white or black. 
Sometimes even clear cases of black will be classified as white, or the other way around, 
but in such cases very strong arguments from (B), (C), or (D) are needed to make this result 
acceptable. Besides the legitimacy concerns mentioned above, legal certainty may also be 
a reason to prefer type (A), or perhaps type (B), over type (C) and type (D) arguments. 
Focusing on the constitution, Goldsworthy puts this as follows: 
 
A constitution laid down by a founding generation 
empowers as well as restricts subsequent generations, 
by providing them with the incalculable benefits of an 
established and accepted set of procedures for making 
collective decisions binding on all their members . . . . If 
some attempt to evade the restrictions, others may be 
tempted to follow suit, leading eventually to the 
collapse of the constitution and the loss of the 
empowerment it provided.
 188
 
 
In the case of constitutional interpretation, however, there are strong arguments for 
attributing evaluative arguments of type (C) a greater weight than usual. The reason for 
this is that constitutions are generally rather abstract,
189
 difficult to amend (i.e., one 
cannot always adapt to a new social situation simply by amending the text),
190
 and 
sometimes ancient as well.
191
 Therefore, sometimes the constitution can be made to fit the 
                                            
186 For a discussion on debates concerning this problem in Austrian scholarship, see Jakab, supra note 128, at 
943–45. 
187 HERBERT HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 120-131 (1961) uses the metaphor of “the open texture of law.” For Hart’s 
thesis being applied to constitutional interpretation, see JOSÉ JUAN MORESO, LEGAL INDETERMINACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 131-71 (1997). 
188 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 FED. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
189 Moreover, constitutional ideas, and therefore the abstract provisions implementing them, partly contradict 
one another, see EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING  58–60 (1949). 
190 BENJAMIN L. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 83 (1921). 
191 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Introduction, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS. A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 66, at 5. This 
argument does not apply, though, to most European countries where constitutions are usually younger than civil 
or criminal codes. 
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altered circumstances by modifying the interpretation.
192
 The concerns of legitimacy and 
legal certainty can be answered, in turn, by always tracing the arguments back to the text 
of the constitution and referring to the methods of type (C) moderately, as opposed to 
complete abstinence. Moreover, most, but not all, of type (C) arguments can be 
substituted by a skillful use of the systemic arguments of type (B). There is no general 
standard as to the proportions of use; one must rely on the country specific expectations 
of the professional community of constitutional lawyers. 
 
VI. Summary of Part B 
 
If we had to formulate the most essential thesis of the present paper as regards to 
methods of constitutional interpretation, it might be the following: The constitution has to 
be interpreted (A) always according to its text, (B) yet adapting to the changing 
circumstances. Among the several methods of interpretation discussed above, which all 
aim to resolve this apparent tension in constitutional interpretation, the most important 
one is the objective teleological method, even though some European legal cultures do not 
really use it to its full potential. The teleological method can reduce, if the objective telos is 
determined on the basis of actual passages of the constitution, the danger of arbitrariness 
and legal uncertainty while allowing for flexibility. In determining the telos of the text, one 
ought to be as exact as possible, not speaking of general purposes of the legal order or of 
the constitution, as these may well lead to quasi-religious debates of political philosophy, 
which are, in practice, regrettably difficult to carry out in a reasonable way. 
 
The objective teleological method can be used not only as a particular method of 
interpretation, but also as a meta-argument for choosing between the different possible 
interpretations obtained by the other methods. If, however, the interpretation obtained by 
an objective teleological argument can also be constructed by systemic arguments (i.e., 
those of type (B)), then arguments of type (B) have to be preferred, as they may raise 
fewer legitimacy concerns. The objective teleological line of thought serves in such cases as 
an unspoken control, (i.e., we do it quietly, internally, but it is unnecessary to mention it in 
the reasoning, and it does not need to be referred to explicitly, as one has the desirable 
outcome anyway. One has to see, however, that in the case of fundamental rights one 
almost always relies on the teleological arguments, as the systemic arguments cannot in 
themselves help in this area. 
 
C. The Conceptual System of Constitutional Law (Verfassungsdogmatik) 
 
                                            
192 A change in the Constitution without a formal amendment to the text (i.e. modification through interpretation) 
is called Verfassungswandlung by Jellinek. GEORG JELLINEK, VERFASSUNGSÄNDERUNG UND VERFASSUNGSWANDLUNG 9, 21, 
26-27 (1906). 
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The aim of constitutional reasoning is to find the solution for a case in the constitution. Yet 
with the help of the above techniques, and based on the text of the constitution, an 
abstract—i.e., separate from actual cases, generally valid—conceptual system 
(Rechtsdogmatik) or constitutional conceptual system (Verfassungsdogmatik) can be 
constructed,
193
 which may help to decide future cases, by eliminating contingencies and 
apparent contradictions of the text.
194
 This conceptual system is, however, not always 
based on the text of the constitution. It goes beyond that and stems from beyond the text 
of the constitution; it can partly be the result of a text-independent abstract speculation. 
Verfassungsdogmatik is a necessary and normal phenomenon in constitutional courts and 
in constitutional scholarship in every area of constitutional law. Its most obvious area of 
influence is that of fundamental rights, by building tests for fundamental rights 
restrictions, as their usually short and vague formulation alone would not be sufficient for 
solving cases.
195
 
 
Verfassungsdogmatik is built partly by the constitutional courts, partly by legal scholars. A 
conceptual system is, then, like a semi-prepared product, which one may complete (i.e., 
find a solution for the case) at any time. Like the good host, who—thinking of the future—
fills her fridge with semi-prepared meals (frozen pizzas) that can easily and quickly be used 
when needed, the good jurist builds a conceptual system in preparation for future 
situations where law has to be applied.
196
 
 
I. Coherence 
 
The building of such a conceptual system is largely neglected in dictatorships, as debates of 
constitutional law were not decided by constitutional courts, but on the basis of ad hoc 
                                            
193 A broader conception of Rechtdogmatik (i.e. including not only the conceptual system, but the job of building it 
up) is used e.g. by Ulfrid Neumann, Wissenschaftstheorie der Rechtswissenschaft, in EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE 
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE DER GEGENWART 394, 394-96 (Arthur Kaufmann et al. eds., 2004). We use the concept here in a 
more narrow sense, which likewise allows for a thorough explanation of methodological problems, while making 
the explanation clearer and easier to understand. 
194 Contradictions have to be eliminated by way of interpretation otherwise one cannot contribute to the solution 
of future problems. If contradictions are merely highlighted, those applying the law will stare puzzled at the two 
passages, then decide which passage to follow by tossing a coin, as it were. Our task is to help to avoid this 
arbitrary decision-making process, thus making a calculable functioning of the system possible. See Eike von 
Savigny, Die Rolle der Dogmatik – wissenschaftstheoretisch gesehen, in JURISTICHE DOGMATIK UND 
WISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE, supra note 4, at 104. 
195 See, e.g., in Austria: Karl Spielbüchler, Grundrecht und Grundrechtsformel, in ARBEITSRECHT UND SOZIALE 
GRUNDRECHTE: FESTSCHRIFT HANS FLORETTA 289-307 (Oswin Martinek et al eds., 1983). 
196 If one introduces a legal concept only for understanding and describing (heuristics), but does not intend to use 
it when deciding legal cases, then one has no doctrinal ambitions with it. 
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political reasons.
197
 There is normally no formalized procedure for settling debates among 
state organs.
198
 Similar problems can be seen in the U.K. and France, where judicial review 
of legislation (Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit) is, or was until recently, very limited. In 
dictatorships, a further obstacle to building a Verfassunsdogmatik is that it necessarily also 
means judicial or scholarly rule-making, thus a certain self-empowerment by judges and 
scholars which is not welcomed in any centralized system. 
 
The requirement of building a coherent conceptual system consists of several elements. 
The first and most obvious one is non-contradiction. However, this in itself is not sufficient. 
On the one hand, the system, which cannot be built up in a value-neutral way, should be 
compatible with the fundamental values of the political community.
199
 On the other hand, 
some internal structural criteria have to be met, like the presence of conceptual cross-
references, or the pyramidal and logical nature of the system of used concepts.
200
 The 
latter requirement can be fulfilled only to a certain extent (unlike e.g., the idea of non-
contradiction). 
 
 
 
 
 
II. In Defense of Begriffsjurisprudenz 
 
Elaboration of legal concepts as a goal of jurisprudence may be easily—and pejoratively—
tagged as Begriffsjurisprudenz,
201
 which used to imply that this approach cannot live up to 
the challenges of the present, being some sort of an outdated, and “out of touch with 
reality,” project. In order to dispel any misunderstanding, this problem must be briefly 
addressed. 
                                            
197 This is similar to the conceptual system of administrative law: It becomes sophisticated only if there is judicial 
review of administrative acts. See András Jakab, Wissenschaft vom Verwaltungsrecht: Ungarn, in IUS PUBLICUM 
EUROPAEUM IV, marginal nos. 5 and 16 (Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2011). Constitutional courts are a 
necessary, but on their own, not a sufficient precondition of a sophisticated Verfassungsdogmatik. 
198 As explained infra pp. 35–38, in the absence of judicial review of statutes, the elaboration of a detailed 
constitutional Rechtsdogmatik would really be just a “useless lawyerly pursuit.” 
199 Neil D. MacCormick, Coherence in Legal Justification, in THEORY OF LEGAL SCIENCE 235–51 (Aleksander Peczenik et 
al eds., 1984). 
200 Following Robert Alexy & Aleksander Peczenik, The Concept of Coherence and Its Significance for Discursive 
Rationality, 3 RATIO JURIS 130 (1990) (with some simplification and modification). 
201 The concept comes from RUDOLPH VON JHERING, SCHERZ UND ERNST IN DER JURISPRUDENZ 337 (1884), who used it 
primarily for Puchta. An excellent overview of Puchta’s scholarship is HANS-PETER HAFERKAMP, GEORG FRIEDRICH 
PUCHTA UND DIE “BEGRIFFSJURISPRUDENZ” (2004). 
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First, let us address the problem of unrealism. In legal arguments (i.e., those of legal 
practice), one cannot use arguments commonly accepted in everyday life like effective, 
immoral, or unprofitable. Such arguments have to be translated somehow into legal 
arguments (e.g., the conduct was unlawful).
202
 Arguments of effectiveness, etc., are not 
necessarily irrelevant to law, but they cannot be deployed directly (naked use): It must be 
explained why they are relevant and through which gate they were introduced into legal 
reasoning (e.g., constitutional principles).
203
 Legal scholarship in a traditional, narrow 
sense, which does not cover topics of policy, sociology, history, political philosophy, or 
legal philosophy, also stays within these limits. 
 
The basic problem of the original nineteenth century form of Begriffsjurisprudenz was 
something else. It was out of touch with everyday life not only in the sense just described 
above, because this is true essentially for all traditional kinds of legal conceptual analysis, 
but also because in many cases it did not even try to translate the extra-legal arguments 
into legal ones and neglected them tout court.
204
 Criticism on Begriffsjurisprudenz
205
 can 
therefore be justified only to the extent that it addresses actual logical mistakes committed 
by classical authors of Begriffsjurisprudenz;
206
 but we cannot criticize Begriffsjurisprudenz 
in general as a conceptual game which is out of touch with everyday life, since lawyers 
necessarily work with concepts.
207
 
 
                                            
202 Interests and benefits have to be formulated as rights and duties. See PHILIPPE A. MASTRONARDI, JURISTISCHES 
DENKEN 264–76 (2001). Moral arguments have to be translated likewise. As it is formulated in a decision by the 
ICJ, see South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18) (“It is a court of law, and can take account of 
moral principles only in so far as these are given a sufficient expression in legal form. Law exists, it is said, to serve 
a social need; but precisely for that reason it can do so only through and within the limits of its own discipline. 
Otherwise, it is not a legal service that would be rendered.”). 
203 It is for this reason that journalists and proper constitutional lawyers argue in an apparently different way on 
the same problem. Cf. supra note 56 (discussing the canon of acceptable arguments). 
204 Eugen Bucher, Was ist “Begriffsjurisprudenz”?, in THEORIE UND TECHNIK DER BEGRIFFSJURISPRUDENZ 372 (Werner 
Krawietz ed.,  1976). It is also worth noting that the Interessenjurisprudenz, frequently referred to as the opposite 
of Begriffsjurisprudenz, was not in fact its counterpart but rather complementary to it. This is well shown by the 
fact that the four traditional methods of Savigny (grammatical, logical, systemic and historical) are not replaced 
by the teleological interpretation (of which Jhering is thought to be the inventor): It is added to them as a fifth 
method, cf. GÉZA KISS, A JOGALKALMAZÁS MÓDSZERÉRŐL 53–58 (1909). The opposite of Begriffsjurisprudenz is rather 
the “School of Free Law” (Freirechtsschule). See Bucher, supra note 204, at 372–73. 
205 See especially Philipp Heck, Was ist die Begriffsjurisprudenz, die wir bekämpfen?, 14 DEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 
1456 (1909). 
206 Bucher, supra note 204, at 388; Horst-Eberhard Henke, Wie tot ist die Begriffsjurisprudenz?, in THEORIE UND 
TECHNIK DER BEGRIFFSJURISPRUDENZ, supra note 204, at 415. 
207 Bucher, supra note 204, at 389. 
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Second, as for the elaboration of the conceptual system, one may state the following: It is 
not some kind of self-indulgent worship of the systematic nature as such, but a 
requirement of legal certainty, because a detailed and thoroughly built system of legal 
concepts makes the application of law more predictable. Moreover, one may add that legal 
certainty itself is far from being a goal in itself, but serves the effective functioning of the 
society, or the economy, through predictability. This elaboration of concepts, however, is 
not to be made in a vacuum, but always with an eye on legal practice. Rechtsdogmatik and 
its specific constitutional form, Verfassungsdogmatik, are therefore aids to the legal 
practice, having the task of building up an accurate conceptual system for the sake of legal 
certainty (i.e., the predictability of future practice).
208
 A complete separation of the 
conceptual system from legal practice would result in the inability of those applying the 
law to make use of the insights delivered by legal scholarship due to the absence of links 
(i.e., scholarly works could by no means contribute to the increase of legal certainty). 
Therefore, our starting point has to be the content of concepts, even if this may not always 
be very elegant, as perceived by the relevant legal actors, in the case of a constitution, the 
constitutional court.
209
 If all the relevant actors falsely think “x” to be the content of a 
given concept, while it is in fact “y”, then the content of that concept becomes “x” 
(communis error facit ius). This, however, does not mean that the common opinion 
(herrschende Meinung) could not be put to question. If an implicit—and previously 
undiscovered—consequence of a commonly held opinion “a” contradicts the likewise 
commonly accepted opinion “b,” one of these views may be challenged, the one that is 
more important according to the commonly held opinion “c”). What the relevant actors 
think the content of a given legal text, and its concepts, is becomes manifest through their 
interpretational practice.
210
 
 
A mere collection of the commonly held views on individual legal issues does not suffice, 
however, as such a collection does not cover all the possible problems
211
 without gaps
212
 or 
                                            
208 Some of the concepts of legal theory do not directly contribute to legal certainty, but only as a building block of 
the system. This means that they are generally not directly used in the application of law, yet they are necessary 
for building a coherent system. In this way they help the predictable introduction of new elements (of positive 
law and Rechtsdogmatik) into the system, thereby improving the predictability of the application of law indirectly. 
209 Compare the constitutional-law proverb, “The Constitution is what the judges say it is,” Charles Evans Hughes, 
Speech at Elmira (May 3, 1907), cited by BERNARD SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW VII (1972). For a similar view, see 
Rudolf Smend, Festvortrag zur Feier des zehnjährigen Bestehens des Bundesverfassungsgerichts am 26. Januar 
1962, in DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 24 (1963) (“The Basic Law is now virtually identical with its interpretation 
by the Federal Constitutional Court.”). 
210 Cf. the dictum Hung. CC Dec. CC 57/1991. (XI. 8.) AB (ABH 1991, 236, 239.): “the content and meaning of a legal 
rule is what is attributed to it by the permanent and uniform practice of courts.” For a detailed discussion of this 
concept of Italian origin (diritto vivente or living law), see e.g., ANTONIO RUGGERI & ANTONINO SPADARO, LINEAMENTI DE 
GIUSTIZIA CONSTITUZIONALE 134 (2004). 
211 Building a conceptual system instead of mere reproductivity is also advocated by Henke, supra note 206, at 
414. 
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contradictions.
213
 Such completeness can only be achieved by building up a system, and 
being aware that this goal (i.e., covering all the possible future legal problems without any 
gaps) can never be achieved, but also that one may come closer to this goal by building a 
Rechtsdogmatik rather than by merely reproducing all the past views. This part of the 
legacy of the Begriffsjurisprudenz can also be accepted today.
214
 
 
III. Typical Mistakes in Verfassungsdogmatik 
 
One common mistake is to believe that the meaning of a constitutional provision is defined 
by implementing or detailing statutes. To accept this proposition would lead to the 
absurdity that the ordinary legislator would have the power to modify the meaning of the 
constitution.
215
 In a constitutional democracy, however, it is actually the constitution that 
ought to be used as a tool for interpreting the statutes (verfassungskonforme Auslegung), 
rather than the statutes for interpreting the constitution. Norms of lower rank can be used 
to interpret the constitution only within a historical interpretation. 
  
Another error is mistaking the constitution (Sollen) for the political practice based upon it 
(Sein). There is a view according to which a given interpretation of a constitutional 
provision can be argued for on the basis of how its addressees (e.g., the government or the 
parliament) interpret it.
216
 This view must be rejected, because the constitution is a norm 
by which the political practice is to be measured. Any factual practice or custom of the 
addressees is only a sign of how they understand the respective provision, and this can be 
of interest, particularly if we think that it contradicts the constitution, but has nothing to 
                                                                                                                
212 The ideal of gaplessness is characteristic not only of Begriffsjurisprudenz, but also of the rationalist natural law 
tradition. See GUSTAV BOEHMER, GRUNDLAGEN DER BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTSORDNUNG 2.1, DOGMENGESCHICHTLICHE 
GRUNDLAGEN DES BÜRGERLICHEN RECHTES 63 (1951); with reference to Christian Wolff, see Werner Krawietz, 
Begriffsjurisprudenz, in THEORIE UND TECHNIK DER BEGRIFFSJURISPRUDENZ, supra note 204, at 436. The beginnings of 
conceptual system-building in law are traced back to the scholastics, or its reflections in the works of the 
glossators and commentators, by Harold J. Berman, The Origins of Western Legal Science, in THE WESTERN IDEA OF 
LAW 399, 401, 405 (J. C. Smith & David N. Weisstub eds., 1983). 
213 Even authors outside of the Begriffsjurisprudenz tradition often assume non-contradiction in the case of a legal 
system, see, e.g., J. W. HARRIS, LAW AND LEGAL SCIENCE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE CONCEPTS LEGAL RULE AND LEGAL SYSTEM 11, 
81–83 (1979). 
214 Views of the end of Begriffsjurisprudenz are clearly refuted by e.g. ROBERT ALEXY, THEORIE DER GRUNDRECHTE 38 
(2001). While rejecting mere logical inference, he still thinks that the elaboration of the conceptual system is the 
primary goal of legal scholarship, and on this point he explicitly sides with the tradition of Begriffsjurisprudenz. 
215 See Francis Delpérée, La Constitution et son interpretation, in L’INTERPRÉTATION EN DROIT: APPROCHE 
PLURIDISCIPLINAIRE, supra note 149, at 193. 
216 E.g., ANTIEAU, supra note 74, at 44–45. In French works, such arguments are referred to as coutume 
constituante or coutume constitutionelle (“constitutional custom”). See, e.g., MARCEL PRÉLOT & JEAN BOULOUIS, 
INSTITUTIONS POLITIQUES ET DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 207–16 (1990). On the German debate, see CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, 
VERFASSUNGSGEWOHNHEITSRECHT (1972). 
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say about the right interpretation of the constitution. Among the state organs it is only the 
constitutional court that can give an interpretation of the constitution that is final and 
binding for all.
217
 Political practice may be mentioned in an analysis of 
Verfassungsdogmatik, if this contributes to the exploration of the meaning of the 
constitution, as the document providing the framework rules of politics. But, such issues—
i.e., which particular solution the practice opts for between the limits imposed by the 
constitution—are remote from the genre of traditional legal scholarship; they belong 
rather to the field of political science.  
 
A thorough legal argument also must answer possible counter-arguments and it must be 
able to be generalized to future cases. This is to say, we do not only want to give a 
systematic description of constitutional provisions and cases that have occurred so far, but 
we also want to help and provide direction for future interpretations.
218
 The fact that a 
problem has not yet occurred does not mean that one cannot tell, on the basis of similar, 
past cases and indirectly applicable rules (e.g., principles), which solution would be more 
constitutional than the other.
219
 
 
D. The Style of Constitutional Reasoning in Different Constitutional Courts 
 
The style of constitutional reasoning differs from country to country.
220
 Style can be 
characterized by: (A) Whether creativity or dilemmas are admitted; (B) how technical the 
language is; (C) how elaborate the reasoning is (i.e., whether possible counter-arguments 
are answered in advance); (D) the degree of generalization; (E) whether style is discursive 
or rather magisterial (hierarchical); (F) the degree of rhetoric (i.e., how grandiose the 
                                            
217 The same claim is made, focusing on the U.S. Supreme Court in a more detailed form by Larry Alexander & 
Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). Contrary to this, 
and to our view, is the pluralist (viz. involving the whole of society: die offene Gesellschaft der 
Verfassungsinterpreten) approach of constitutional interpretation put forth by Peter Häberle, see PETER HÄBERLE, 
VERFASSUNG ALS ÖFFENTLICHER PROZESS 150–152 (1996) (ignoring the place of constitutional courts within 
constitutional law). For criticism on Häberle in the same vein (and emphasizing the obscurity of his theory), see 
Christian Starck, Die Verfassungsauslegung, in VII HANDBUCH DES STRAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, 
supra note 2, at 205–06. 
218 For a discussion on this task of the commentaries, see Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz, Was macht die Qualität 
öffentlich-rechtlicher Forschung aus?, JAHRBUCH DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART VOL. VII 1, 20 (Peter Häberle 
ed., 2002). 
219 For a discussion on the nature of principles, see András Jakab, Re-Defining Principles as ‘Important Rules’: A 
Critique of Robert Alexy, in ON THE NATURE OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES 145 (Martin Borowski ed., 2009). 
220 The organic statutes often contain the requirement that constitutional/supreme court decisions must be 
somehow justified, e.g. VfGG [Constitutional Court Act 1953] No. 85/1953 § 26(2) (Austria) (“mit den 
wesentlichen Entscheidungsgründen […] zu verkünden”), but on how exactly it should be done, explicit legal rules, 
except regarding dissenting or parallel opinions, are usually silent. Internal standing orders often refer to certain 
necessary parts of the judgment (e.g., statement of facts, submissions, applied law, whether to separate these 
under different headings, decision on costs), but they also do not say much about the style of the reasoning. 
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reasoning is); (G) the specific methods usually preferred in the respective constitutional 
cultures; and (H) the typical length, layout, and internal structure of judgments, including 
the possibility of dissenting opinions. The features (B), (C), and (D) are defined by the 
Verfassungsdogmatik of the country: The more sophisticated it is, the more technical, the 
more elaborate and the more generalized the reasoning becomes. 
 
We might be tempted to assume that the features of argumentative style could be divided 
into two main groups: External (form, layout, rhetorical and linguistic style, etc.) and 
internal (actual legal content). But this assumption is wrong. External and internal features 
are interconnected. Form and content in legal reasoning are difficult to separate from each 
other, or if we do separate them then our results would be painfully incomplete. It would 
be unsatisfactory to say that we only analyze the number of references to case law, but not 
whether they are actually followed as to their content or rather just mentioned for 
ornamenting the text. Or, it would be unfulfilling to say that the actual number of 
references to precedents is unimportant, and we are interested only in the real influence 
of precedents as to the outcome of new disputes. One is normally indicative of the other, 
and if not, then exactly this lack of connection would be an important result of the analysis. 
Until now, there has been no overarching, in-depth comparative analysis of European 
styles of constitutional reasoning, so we can only present a tentative sketch on the issue 
with the hope of further development in the future.
221
 
 
I. Austria and Germany: Focusing on Verfassungsdogmatik 
 
Both Germany and Austria have a very sophisticated Verfassungsdogmatik, the elaboration 
of which is considered to be the main task of constitutional scholarship, and the 
constitutional courts of these countries do make use of this scholarship. In Germany, the 
Federal Constitutional Court explicitly refers to it in judgments, and in Austria the 
Constitutional Court uses it mostly without reference.
222
 Consequently, constitutional 
                                            
221 Cf. Goldsworthy, supra note 66, (including from Europe only Germany and, from outside Europe, the US, India, 
Canada, South Africa and Australia); MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND LEGITIMACY (2004) (comparing the U.S. Supreme Court, the ECJ, and the French Cour de 
cassation, thus not treating any national constitutional court in Europe). For some European reports, with serious 
contributions only from Germany, Austria, and France though, but without an actual comparison, see 
VERFASSUNGSINTERPRETATION IN EUROPA (Georg Lienbacher ed., 2011). For general studies in judicial style, see Basil 
Markesinis, Conceptualism, Pragmatism and Courage, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 349 (1986); Basil Markesinis, A Matter of 
Style, 110 L.Q. REV. 607 (1994); Jean Louis Goutal, Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, Britain, and the USA, 
24 AM. J. COMP. L. 43 (1976); Bernard Rudden, Courts and Codes in England, France and Soviet Russia, 48 TUL. L. 
REV. 1010 (1974); MacCormick & Summers, supra note 57; MacCormick & Summers, supra note 52. In September 
2011, a research group began to work at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International 
Law in Heidelberg in the frame of a five years project on “Comparative Constitutional Reasoning” to fill in this 
research gap, see CONREASON PROJECT, http://www.conreasonproject.com/. 
222 The relevance of scholarship for constitutional reasoning might be the consequence of the fact that, most of 
the time, the majority of these constitutional courts consists of law professors or former university assistants. 
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reasoning in these countries is technical, elaborate, and open for generalization. Solutions 
for constitutional problems are mostly depicted as necessary consequences of the 
conceptual system, and not as dilemmas to be decided by judges. There are, however, 
important differences between these two countries. 
 
In Austrian Verfassungsdogmatik, legal issues are more often conceptualized in the 
language of theory of norms. E.g., competence conflicts between the federal government 
and the governments of the Länder are conceptualized as conflicts between the federal 
constitution, federal statutes and Länder constitutions, without any reference to the 
concept of sovereignty.
223
 Argumentation tends to be simpler and more readily 
comprehensible than in Germany. Austrians consider their own argumentation style to be 
more elegant and more modest, applying less rhetoric, also trying to be shorter
224
 than 
the German style. Austrian argumentation seldom includes the reinforcing, secondary, or 
backup arguments typical in Germany. Kelsen’s theoretical legacy is used frequently 
(Stufenbaulehre, three circle theory of the federal state). All in all, Kelsen’s influence is 
enormous, as arguments based on natural law and sociology are generally not highly 
regarded. 
 
German Verfassungsdogmatik still employs many basic terms from the period of 
constitutional monarchy.
225
 In Hans Kelsen’s stead, the key figures are Rudolf Smend and 
Konrad Hesse, and Carl Schmitt, whose lines of argumentation often appear in the Federal 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence.
226
 These arguments often make use of terms that do 
admittedly have an intuitive, descriptive value but cannot be strictly legally defined (e.g., 
community, integration, or Gesamtheiten
227
). This argumentation tendency brings with it 
an inclination towards compound nouns and somewhat mysterious, one could say 
pretentious, rhetorical figures: “The law as an ordering factor,”
228
 or “the federal order is a 
                                            
223 Jakab, supra note 128, at 935-40. 
224 The short style has the advantage of being able to hand down faster decisions, thus contributing to a faster 
enforcement of constitutional claims. Peter Pernthaler & Peter Pallwein-Prettner, Die Entscheidungsbegründung 
des österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs, in DIE ENTSHEIDUNGSBEGRÜNDUNG IN EUROPÄISCHEN VERFAHRENSRECHTEN 
UND IM VERFAHREN VOR INTERNATIONALEN GERICHTEN, supra note 45, at 210. 
225 Cf. STERN, supra note 33, at 584-86. Reference is frequently made to such traditional platitudes as, for example, 
the equating of executive power with the application of the law without any mention of government decrees or 
regulations. See, e.g., KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZÜGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 88 (20th ed. 
1995). 
226 ROBERT CHR. VAN OOYEN, DER BEGRIFF DES POLITISCHEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS (2005). 
227 HESSE, supra note 225, at 97. 
228 Id. at 86 (in German, Recht als Ordnungsfaktor). 
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form of federative structure.”
229
 One often comes across reasoning based on political 
science and also occasionally on natural law.
230
 This style of thinking has the advantage of 
facilitating argumentation (fruitful lack of clarity); in exchange, the disadvantage lies in the 
unpredictability of the results of such argumentation. In general, one argues from a greater 
number of premises, and attempts to find more alternative arguments for the desired 
result. Thus, argumentation follows more than one line, and these lines are more 
complicated and less pointed. Germans argue more often from broad, general principles 
(democracy, human dignity, etc.) to concrete problems. In Austria, such activist tendencies 
are more seldom, albeit not unheard of. Opinions of the Federal Constitutional Court are 
often lengthy, written almost in scholarly monographic style,
231
 and their Austrian 
counterparts are usually much shorter. 
 
Also the political context has influence on the style of reasoning: In Austria, the almost 
permanent constitution-making majority of the government since the Second World War 
(“grand coalition”) made the Constitutional Court less likely to venture into creative 
interpretation against the legislator.
232
 In Germany, however, the FCC considered itself 
right from the beginning as the missionary of liberal and democratic values after the 
downfall of Nazism. Also, on those rare occasions where grand coalition existed with a 
constitution-making majority, a conflict with the FCC would have been a taboo in German 
political culture. 
 
In Austria, dissenting opinions are not allowed at all at the Constitutional Court because 
the authority of law is perceived to be better protected by a unified voice. In Germany, 
dissenting opinions are used rather rarely for the very same reason. This practice also 
results in hiding contentious general, non-legal issues, and concentrating on strictly legal 
approaches. The German references to supra-positive norms or an objective value order 
are unknown. Dissenting opinions or references to scholarly opinions are also avoided in 
Austria.
233
 Otherwise, the structure of constitutional court judgments is very similar: 
                                            
229 Id. at 97 (in German, Bundesstaatliche Ordnung ist Form föderativer Gestaltung). One can only guess as to its 
meaning. 
230 Or etatistic (state-centered) combinations of both, such as the figure of a state’s recognition of a right. See 
STERN, supra note 33, at 588. 
231 Matthias Jestaedt, Phänomen Bundesverfassungsgericht, in DAS ENTGRENZTE GERICHT 125 (Christoph Schönberger 
ed., 2011). 
232 For a different explanation referring to the dismissal of the judges of the Constitutional Court in 1929, see 
Ewald Wiederin, Verfassungsinterpretation in Österreich, in VERFASSUNGSINTERPRETATION IN EUROPA, supra note 221, 
at 105. 
233 Pernthaler & Pallwein-Prettner, supra note 224, at 207–208 (referring to VfSlg 2455/1952 where the Austrian 
Constitutional Court explicitly refused to discuss scholarly opinions. But in fact, scholarly opinions, often 
contained in the submissions, hugely influence the decisions.) 
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Doctrinal elaboration dominates the approach to 
constitutional argument and legal writing generally. 
The FCC’s full senate opinions tend to be heavily 
oriented toward normative theorizing and definitional 
refinement. In contrast to the breathtaking brevity of 
and incisiveness of French Constitutional Council 
decisions, the typical German opinion is an exercise in 
encyclopedic scholarship. The typical case reads like a 
sophisticated—and often turgid—American law 
student research note . . . . It seems rather clear that 
these opinions, which reflect a thorough survey of the 
literature pertaining to a particular set of constitutional 
issues, are written less for the general public than for 
the academic legal profession. Opinion writing on the 
FCC is designed largely to persuade the academic legal 
community—and other informed readers—of the 
rightness, neutrality, and integrity of decisional 
outcomes. The typical case begins with Leitzsätze 
(leading sentences) or “headnotes” summarizing its 
essential holding. The opinion then proceeds 
systematically (1) to describe the case’s factual, legal, 
and procedural background, (2) to recapitulate—
usually in great detail—arguments advanced by 
petitioners and respondents, (3) to rule on the 
admissibility of the complaint or the legitimacy of the 
issue referred to the Court, and (4) to pass upon the 
merits of the case in an extended judgment that seeks 
to resolve all relevant constitutional issues.
 234
 
 
As a final remark, one can say that both German and Austrian legal scholars depict each 
other as proponents of an outdated methodology. As described above, from a traditional 
Austrian vantage point, German constitutional scholarship appears to be stuck at a (pre-
)Jellinekian methodological level, that is, the mixing of legal and sociological arguments; 
the presentation of personal views on legal policy as theoretically compulsory legal 
conclusions. From the other side of the border, in contrast, the Kelsenian style in Austria is 
                                            
234 Donald P. Kommers, Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 
supra note 66, at 210. For a discussion on the distinctively scholarly style of BVerfG decisions, see Peter Lerche, 
Stil und Methode verfassungsgerichtlicher Entscheidungspraxis, in FESTSCHRIFT 50 JAHRE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 
VOL. I, 333 (Peter Badura & Horts Dreier eds., 2001). The abstract style serves also as a means of self-
empowerment as the FCC creates in this way long-term detailed, and seemingly objective, standards for politics, 
see Oliver Lepsius, Die maßstabsetzende Gewalt, in DAS ENTGRENZTE GERICHT, supra note 231, at 171-81.  
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viewed as an absurd and unproductive caricature of an outmoded, formalistic nineteenth 
century Begriffsjurisprudenz.
235
 But from a French or British perspective, these two 
Germanic styles can look very similar indeed. 
 
II. France and the U.K.: Limited Judicial Review Resulting in Limited Conceptual 
Sophistication 
 
Both in France and the U.K., we find a lot less references to scholarly works in judgments. 
In the U.K., it is because of the generally low prestige of legal scholarship; in France, 
references to scholarly works are rare because of legitimacy concerns, legal scholars have 
not been elected democratically. The German-Austrian style of Verfassungsdogmatik is 
considered to be rather quixotic, which can be explained partly by the lack, or at least the 
late birth, of an overarching, constitutional review of statutes in these countries. 
  
In France, until very recently there was only a priori constitutional review,
236
 and 
consequently only a very few cases came to the Constitutional Council.
237
 Most 
constitutional conflicts were not enforceable in courts, thus building any sophisticated 
conceptual system of constitutional law would have been futile, as the conflicts were 
decided by politicians according to the rules of politics. Also the commentary literature 
explaining the meaning of each constitutional provision in the form of individual scholarly 
contributions containing references to academic literature and case law, so popular in 
Germany and Austria, is almost entirely missing in France.
238
 We can predict that with the 
recent introduction of the a posteriori constitutional review, the situation is likely to 
change. The need for a more sophisticated Verfassungsdogmatik will be more eminent, the 
literature of constitutional commentary will become stronger, even references to scholarly 
works in judgments might become more usual. 
 
The language and the form of the decisions of the Constitutional Council are extremely 
technical, being one very long sentence. The elaboration of the reasoning is sometimes 
                                            
235 See, e.g., NORBERT ACHTERBERG, DIE ÖFFENTLICHE VERWALTUNG 445-54 (1974) (Hans Kelsens Bedeutung in der 
gegenwärtigen deutschen Staatslehre) (citing, inter alia, HERMANN KLENNER, RECHTSLEERE: DIE VERURTEILUNG DER 
REINEN RECHTSLEHRE (1972)). See also HORST DREIER ET AL., REZEPTION UND ROLLE DER REINEN RECHTSLEHRE 25, 29 (2001) 
(citing, inter alia, Larenz, Heller, Schmitt, and Smend); HORST DREIER, RECHTSLEHRE, STAATSSOZIOLOGIE UND 
DEMOKRATIETHEORIE BEI HANS KELSEN 19–25 (1986). 
236 Federico Fabbrini, Kelsen in Paris: France’s Constitutional Reform and the Introduction of a Posteriori 
Constitutional Review of Legislation, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1297 (2008). 
237 The original 1958 French Constitutional Council was classified as an example of the “political [i.e. non-judicial] 
control of constitutionality,” see MAURO CAPPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 2–6 (1971). 
238 For a notable exception, but as a noticeably shorter and less sophisticated version of its German counterparts, 
see CODE CONSTITUTIONNEL (Michel de Villiers & Thierry Renoux eds., 2011). 
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questionable; decisions are mostly a few lines long, rarely longer than two printed pages, 
thus much shorter than German or Austrian decisions, even if lately they have been slightly 
increasing in length. Dilemmas are practically never shown; which is strengthened by the 
fact that there are no dissenting or concurring opinions. Solutions are presented as 
stemming from the text of the Constitution, or from the 1789 Declaration, without any 
trick of interpretation.
239
 This can be explained by a certain traditional shyness of the 
French judges who feel they lack the legitimacy to decide cases, thus pointing simply at the 
Constitution as if they were just its mouthpiece.
240
 Academic doctrine does have a high 
standing in France, as opposed to the U.K.,
241
 but it is not quoted in judgments; it has 
influence on future decisions and it is widely read by judges, again, as opposed to the U.K. 
Moral or policy perspectives are not mentioned explicitly in the judgments themselves 
(which, of course, does not mean that they are not considered behind the scenes).
242
 
 
The structure of the decisions of the Constitutional Council is always strictly the same.
243
 
(A) At the beginning of the decision there is an introductory head note about the 
                                            
239 For a discussion on French constitutional reasoning, see Luc Heuschling, Verfassungsinterpretation in 
Frankreich, in VERFASSUNGSINTERPRETATION IN EUROPA, supra note 221, at 37–68. 
240 This still lasting judicial shyness can be depicted as the legacy of the French Revolution of 1789. At that time, 
judges were considered as corrupt and, as far as it was possible within the limits of corruption, as royalist, both 
for good reasons. Thus the revolutionaries and their imperial successors during Napoleon did everything to limit 
the power of the judges ranging from the explicit prohibition of the binding power of judgments on future cases 
in the Code civil to placing the judicial review of administrative actions into the hands of the State Council (a 
traditional advisory institution, filled up with high profile bureaucrats and reliable politicians) instead of ordinary 
courts. See Goutal, supra note 221; Rudden, supra note 221. They even introduced the institution of référé 
legislatif, which basically meant that judges had to ask the legislator if they were uncertain about the correct 
interpretation of a statute, see Loi du 27 novembre 1790 instituant un tribunal de cassation et reglant sa 
composition, son organization et ses attributions [Law of November 27, 1790 Establishing a Court of Appeals and 
Regulating its Composition, Organization and Responsibilities], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE [J.O.] 
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Aug. 20, 1944, p. 65; Loi n°1790-12-01 du 1 décembre 1790 portant institution d'un 
tribunal de cassation et réglant sa composition, son organization et ses attributions [Law No. 1790-12-01 of 
December 1, 1790 on the Establishment of a Court of Cassation and Adjusting its Composition, Organization and 
Functions] (repealed 2007) that resulted in slowing down trials and in the legislator’s constantly rewriting of the 
statutes which it was asked about. The institution is now only legal history which, however, was widely used also 
in German territories during the 19th century, see MATTHIAS MIERSCH, DER SOGENANNTE RÉFÉRÉ LEGISLATIF (2000). 
241 For the situation in England in general, see FH Lawson, Doctrinal Writing: A Foreign Element in English Law, in 
IUS PRIVATUM GENTIUM: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR MAX RHEINSTEIN VOL. I. 191–210 (1969). 
242 Proven on the example of the Cour de cassation by LASSER, supra note 221, at 27–61. 
243 The obsessively strict French requirements on forms and style can be seen also in constitutional (or in general, 
legal) scholarship: doctoral theses have to consist of two parts (A and B), each of them consisting of two sub-parts 
(le plan). Any alteration of this structure has to be thoroughly justified. This seemingly logical structure results in 
the violation of the internal logic of topics and occasionally results in more effort being put into the structure than 
into the intellectual content. For foreigners, this structure makes it very difficult to make use of French 
constitutional literature, and it therefore contributes to the isolation of French constitutional scholarship. 
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constitutional empowerment of the Constitutional Council and the short history of the 
procedure—initiators, submission date. (B) Then under the heading Le Conseil 
constitutionnel, we find a list of the titles of the relevant statutes, and submissions. Each 
entry is a new paragraph which finishes with a semicolon, resulting in one long sentence 
consisting of paragraphs beginning with Vu (having seen); the list ends with the entry Le 
rapporteur ayant été entendu (the reporter having been heard). (C) The considered legal 
arguments, sometimes structured with subtitles, sometimes not, are listed again as part of 
a long sentence ending with Décide (decides). The arguments are always introduced in a 
new line beginning with Considérant que (considering that or whereas). (D) The actual 
decision is then to be found under the heading Décide. (E) At the end of the decision, the 
date and the judges taking part in the decision are listed.
244
 
 
In the U.K., judgments are generally longer than in any other country in the world, with no 
predefined structure except for a usual beginning fact description, the procedural steps, 
the submissions of the parties, the legal reasoning, and the final verdict, as the case load of 
judges is very low.
245
 Traditionally, judges also perceived as one of their tasks the lecturing 
of young lawyers sitting in court hearings. Thus they explained everything in detail, and 
showed all the dilemmas to the future generation of judges sitting eagerly in the audience. 
The language is therefore a lot less technical than in France or even in Austria or Germany; 
the style is rather discursive.
246
 Cases are rather just ad hoc solutions, no general 
conceptual system is meant to be built from them. Purposive interpretation was in general 
not particularly popular, as Parliament could easily change any law, so in case of a socially 
unacceptable legal solution Parliament was meant to change it, not the courts. A purposive 
interpretation is becoming more and more popular though, partly due to the influence of 
EU law and ECHR law, the latter of which is the most similar to a constitution of the U.K. as 
                                            
244 This style and structure of judgments is very similar to the ordinary court judgments. For a detailed analysis 
and a historical explanation with further references on the judgments of ordinary courts, see LASSER, supra note 
221, at 30–38; HEIN KÖTZ, Über den Stil höchstrichterlicher Entscheidungen, RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND 
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 1973, 245, 247–252 (1973); PIERRE MIMIN, LE STYLE DES JUGEMENTS: VOCABULAIRE, 
CONSTRUCTION, DIALECTIQUE, FORMES JURIDIQUES (1978). 
245 Goutal, supra note 221, at 61–65. 
246 The style of constitutional scholarship literature is similar to the style of judgments: lengthy, essayistic style 
(sometimes rather an unstructured textflow or collection of legal and non-legal information), building inductively 
on a series of examples explained in detail with an impressive eloquence, often with numerous proverbs and 
metaphors, but in a conceptually and methodologically rather undisciplined and unstructured manner. It reminds 
one rather of the speeches of barristers or judges in courts, than of continental Verfassungsdogmatik. Large 
amounts of non-legal, factual political, or political philosophical, information are also contained in the works 
(besides legal history, never or just not yet enacted draft statutes, or policy papers) which might be explained by 
the sporadic and unsystematic nature of British constitutional law itself (corrected in practice by non-legal 
constitutional conventions as a modus vivendi). On the latter point in general see GEOFFREY MARSHALL, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE RULES AND FORMS OF POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY (1984). Consequently, the context of 
law seems to have sometimes even more emphasis than law itself, also in mainstream legal scholarship. 
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you can get. In the U.K., dissenting or parallel opinions are not simply a rarely used 
possibility, like in Germany, but are the default position. 
 
Interestingly, both in France and the U.K., some of the most recent developments in 
constitutional theory are heavily relying on German, and to a lesser extent Austrian, 
background literature.
247
 It is unlikely that the style of constitutional reasoning will 
become fully Germanized, but the influence is apparent and one-sided as there is no 
similar French or U.K. influence in Germany.
248
 
 
III. Hungary and Spain: Copying the German Model After the End of the Dictatorship 
 
After the end of dictatorships, both Spain and Hungary opted for the German 
constitutional model and its accessories in constitutional reasoning, like dissenting 
opinions. The U.K. model with no formal constitutional guarantees seemed to be a 
dangerous option. The decentralized American constitutional review looked chaotic, and 
ordinary judges were servants of the ancien régime who could not be trusted to be 
guardians of the new democratic constitution.  In lack of strong democratic traditions, a 
very strong president looked too much like a to-be dictator, so basically the choice was 
between a semi-parliamentary French system and the parliamentary German system; the 
unstable Italian parliamentary system looked less attractive, and there were no further 
major western democracies to look at. Some European post-dictatorial countries opted for 
the French model, but most chose the German model.
249
 The German constitutional 
system had been built up exactly as an intellectually sophisticated response to a former 
dictatorship. So, especially with its strong constitutional court, it seemed to fit such 
situations much more aptly than the French model, which originally was an answer to the 
incapacity of the executive branch to govern. The choice was partly motivated by the 
generous German scholarship policy, which meant that some of the talented constitutional 
lawyers from the new democracies had already spent several months or years at a German 
university or at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law 
                                            
247 OLIVIER BEAUD, LA PUISSANCE DE L’ÉTAT (1994); MICHEL TROPER, POUR UNE THÉORIE JURIDIQUE DE L’ÉTAT (1994); MARTIN 
LOUGHLIN, FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW (2010). 
248 It is not the first time that European continental, more specifically, German, legal methodology has influenced 
its English counterpart. For a discussion on Samuel Pufendorf’s influence on Blackstone, see Jan Schröder, Zur 
gesamteuropäischen Tradition der juristischen Methodenlehre, 2/2002 AKADEMIE-JOURNAL 37, 40. For a discussion 
on Savigny’s influence on John Austin, see HERBERT HART, Introduction, in THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED: 
AND THE USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE vii, vii (1971). 
249 The Portuguese and the Spanish constitutional courts as daughters of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(originally by Roman Herzog), the Hungarian and the Polish as his ‘grandchildren’, see László Sólyom, 
Anmerkungen zur Rezeption auf dem Gebiet der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Rechte aus ungarischer Sicht, in 
GRUNDFRAGEN DER VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN MITTEL- UND OSTEUROPA 83 (Jochen Abr. Frowein and Thilo Marauhn 
eds., 1998). 
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in Heidelberg. Accordingly, they all had learned the democratic style of constitutional law 
from German literature. Once they had a position at the constitutional court of their home 
country, either as a judge or as an advisor of a judge, they implemented what they had 
experienced in Germany. 
 
The style of constitutional reasoning in these relatively new democracies depended on 
how the legacy of the dictatorial past, and the few local innovations, merged with the new 
German transplants. During the dictatorship there were no constitutional courts in the 
dictatorships in socialist Eastern Europe (except for a very few façade constitutional courts 
with practically no activity whatsoever), so we cannot look for socialist case law in order to 
identify the socialist elements in today’s constitutional thought. We cannot use 
constitutional texts either, as the text of the constitutions has been almost entirely 
changed. Consequently, for the legacy of dictatorships we have to check rather the old 
constitutional scholarship and how it still influences today’s constitutional reasoning both 
in the constitutional courts and in the literature. 
 
In Hungary, socialist constitutional law literature basically contained four elements: (A) 
Explanations of how true the teachings of Marx and Lenin were; (B) descriptions of the 
factual political situation; (C) repetition of constitutional or, constitutionally relevant, 
statutory texts; (D) proposals for new laws. The traditional task of legal scholarship, i.e., 
proposing a new interpretation of an old law, was almost entirely missing. The first 
element died out naturally after the end of socialism, so the three others remained. The 
second element, the description of the factual political situation, resulted in textbooks, 
where political science merged with constitutional law.
250
 As to the third element, the 
repetitive and intellectually shy style of analyzing constitutional provisions and relevant 
statutes reflects itself not only in the literature, but to some extent also in the 
constitutional court. The court’s reliance on literal methods of interpretation and the 
refusal of teleological, sometimes even systemic, arguments is typical.
251
  
 
As to the final element, a typical mistake of today’s Hungarian Verfassungsdogmatik is to 
deliver meditations de lege constitutione, instead of conceptual analysis.
252
 Legal scholars 
                                            
250 Some even proudly criticize from this confused methodological point of view the attempts at building a 
Verfassungsdogmatik. See György Müller, Kormányzati viszonyainkról az új alkotmánykommentár “A Kormány” 
című fejezete kapcsán, 1 JOGELMÉLETI SZEMLE (2010), http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/muller41.html. For a response, see 
Vilmos Térey, Csodaváróknak, 2 JOGELMÉLETI SZEMLE (2010), http://jesz.ajk.elte.hu/terey42.html. 
251 The school of Hungarian textualists, as analyzed in András Jakab, Wissenschaft und Lehre des 
Verfassungsrechts in Ungarn, in IUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM VOL. II, marginal numbers 23-30 (Armin von Bogdandy et 
al. eds., 2007), represent this symptom. 
252 This is particularly dangerous in the field of constitutional law, as it may lead the scholarly debate into one of 
political confessions. Arguments of constitutional law are (sometimes rightly) subject to ‘ideological insinuation’ 
anyway. See Hans Peter Ipsen, Die deutsche Staatsrechtswissenschaft im Spiegel der Lehrbücher, 106 ARCHIV DES 
ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS 161, 198 (1981). 
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doing so do not help constitutional courts. They just dream about a better constitutional 
text, and substitute real lawyerly conceptual analysis with useless future plans. This type of 
legal scholarship dominated the landscape in socialist countries, where according to the 
official doctrine of socialist normativism attempts were made to turn judges into law-
applying machines, using literal interpretation and law-making power lay with the 
Parliament. The Parliament followed the scientific and modern socialist views in order to 
transform society into socialism and later into communism. For the big reform plan they 
needed advisors on how to use law as an instrument of social transformation. The advisors 
were legal scholars presenting de lege ferenda works to the legislator for further use.
253
 If 
the legislator is legally omnipotent (i.e., there are no constitutional constraints, even the 
constitution can easily be amended),
254
 then we do not have to deal with intricate 
doctrinal questions at all, and we can concentrate on the instrumental character of law. 
Law was a means to change society, and lawyers were needed only to wield this 
instrument. This socialist legacy is getting weaker, newer generations are influenced 
primarily by German,
255
 secondarily by American patterns, but probably for several 
decades its traces will remain strong in Hungary. 
 
In Franco’s Spain, the binding force of the constitution (Fundamental Laws of the Kingdom) 
was institutionally weak as a constitutional court did not exist. Consequently, also 
Verfassungsdogmatik remained unsophisticated as most constitutional lawyers 
understandably did not bother to work on it. The university subject and the title of 
textbooks was derecho político, merging historical and ideological descriptions with the 
repetition of statutory provisions—very similar to Hungary.
256
 In the new democratic 
system, very often whole full constructions of Verfasungsdogmatik have been borrowed 
from Germany, sometimes even original German words (e.g., Drittwirkung) are used in 
Spanish texts. This doctrinal import is mostly well understood, but sometimes it is 
imprecise or it does not accommodate the Spanish constitutional text.
257
 Thus, surprisingly, 
comparative law arguments sometimes prevail over all other methods of interpretation, 
breaching our normative methodological considerations above. 
                                            
253 See Jakab, supra note 127, at 607–08. 
254 At this point, the Westminster system and the socialist countries were very similar. 
255 See CATHERINE DUPRÉ, IMPORTING THE LAW IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONS. THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND 
THE RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 65–86 (2003); SÓLYOM, supra note 160, at 230–41. 
256 For an exception, see MANUEL GARCÍA-PELAYO, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL COMPARADO (1950), not a strictly doctrinal 
analysis, but rather an institutional and historical comparison. García-Pelayo left the country during Franco 
because of his political ideas and first returned after the regime change. 
257 Leonardo Álvarez, Die spanische Dogmatik der Verfassungstreue. Geschichte einer fehlgeschlagenen Rezeption 
des deutschen Verfassungsdenkens, 70 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 433 
(2010). For similar problems in Hungary concerning human dignity, see Jakab, supra note 251, at n. 71. 
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IV. Is There a European Style of Constitutional Reasoning? 
 
To be able to talk about a European style of constitutional reasoning we should be able to 
name some features which are common to European constitutional cultures, but which do 
not characterize non-European (e.g., U.S.) constitutional reasoning. Unfortunately, or 
fortunately, there are no such features. The most we can get are different emphases. The 
average U.S. Supreme Court judgment uses more substantive moral, sociological, or 
economic reasons, than their European counterparts, as the general judicial style is more 
substantive in the U.S.
258
 Also, the conscious rejection of the use of comparative law 
arguments based on legitimacy concerns is rather a U.S. feature than a European one.
259
 
Radical originalism is also rather an American phenomenon, explained by the sacred and 
identity-building nature of the U.S. Constitution,
260
 even though questioned in the U.S. 
too.
261
 
 
In Europe, neither the European Court of Justice (ECJ), nor the ECtHR, has unified the style 
of constitutional reasoning; only a stronger presence of teleological arguments can be 
attributed to them, at least in countries where formerly it was less common.
262
 Also, the 
                                            
258 Judges in the U.S. often behave like politicians (state judges are sometimes directly elected by the local 
population for a limited term, federal judges are appointed mostly exactly because of party membership and 
loyalty, so their audience is much less the legal profession than the electing people or the appointing politicians), 
so non-legal (political, social, policy, moral) arguments are much more acceptable for them than in other 
countries. ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 342, 344, 350–51, 379. 
259 According to Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Conclusions, in INTERPRETING CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY, supra note 
66, at 342, the real reason for the low popularity of comparative law arguments in the U.S. is that the Constitution 
is old, thus there is a bigger pool of precedents to rely on for the solution of new cases. Comparative law is 
therefore rather used where guidance is needed because the Constitution is new. In Europe, the integration 
rather results in a growing use of comparative constitutional law in constitutional reasoning. See Ingolf Pernice, 
Europarechtswissenschaft oder Staatslehre?, in STAATSLEHRE ALS WISSENSCHAFT 239 (Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz ed., 
2007). 
260 Robert C. Post, Constitutional Scholarship in the United States, 7 INT’L J. CONST. L. 418 (2009). 
261 Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: Paradoxes and Contrasts, in 
EUROPEAN AND US CONSTITUTIONALISM 187-94 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005). 
262 For a discussion on the teleological practices of the ECJ, see JOXERAMMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 181–270 (1993); ANNA BREDIMAS, METHODS OF 
INTERPRETATION AND COMMUNITY LAW 70–105 (1978) (calling it the ‘functional method’). For a discussion on the 
‘dynamic interpretation’ of the ECtHR, see Hans-Joachim Cremer, Regeln der Konventionsinterpretation, in 
EMRK/GG. KONKORDANZKOMMENTAR ZUM EUROPÄISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN GRUNDRECHTSSCHUTZ 155–230 (Rainer Grote & 
Thilo Marauhn eds., 2006). For a discussion on the influence of the EC (EU) on the British judicial style, see 
Jonathan E. Levitsky, The Europeanization of the British Legal Style, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 347 (1994). For recent 
normative accounts of how the ECJ and the ECHR should reason, see GERARD CONWAY, THE LIMITS OF LEGAL REASONING 
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (2012); GEORGE LETSAS, A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS (2007). 
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German style of constitutional reasoning is nearer to the U.S., than to the French, even 
though Germany does have a strong influence on some European countries. It is clearly the 
most influential European constitutional culture, both intellectually in content and 
financially (especially via scholarship programs in Germany for foreign constitutional 
scholars) promoting its own ideas. While until now it has been unable to significantly alter 
the style of constitutional reasoning in France or the U.K., Germany has been able to 
partially indirectly influence the U.S., as evidenced by the import of the proportionality 
test.
263
 
 
The differences in constitutional reasoning in European countries are partly based on 
historical and institutional coincidences, partly on implied theoretical presuppositions of a 
legal community, and on general mentalities,
264
 the latter of which are unlikely to 
converge in the near future. So, to put it shortly, currently there is no such thing as a 
European style of constitutional reasoning. The question is rather whether we should have, 
and whether one day we will have, such a common style in Europe. 
 
For the combined purposes of constitutionalism and legal certainty, this style should 
converge and it should be based on a sophisticated Verfassungsdogmatik. Whether it will 
happen, and what exactly this style will to look like, especially how strong the German 
influence will be, is still open. 
  
                                            
263 Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 72 (2008). 
264 Jakab, supra note 128, at 953–55. 
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